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viiAVANT-PROPOS
Despite the lack of natural ability, I did have the one
element necessary to all early creativity: naïveté, this
fabulous quality that keeps you from knowing just how
unsuited you are for what you are about to do.
— Steve Martin, Born Standing Up
Time sure ﬂies fast! While most of my friends were busy founding
(and funding) families, I was busy writing this blue booklet. And
now, after 5 years that felt like 15, it is ﬁnally time to write this avant-
propos (French for foreword, you are welcome). This section is about the
personal part of this saga, so let’s write it at the image of its creator:
entertaining (at least, that’s the intent), falsely modest, and lacking the
deferential tone proper to academia. And grateful. Mostly grateful.
Very grateful, ﬁrst and foremost, to my supervisor Arthur. What
to say about Arthur? I could talk about his astonishing intelligence
and his passion for empirical research, but I would not know what to
say that has not been said a thousand times... And I believe that his
greatest quality lies elsewhere: Arthur is a great mentor. I am always
amazed at how he manages to help his students achieve the best of
their potential, no matter how (un)skilled we are. I will remember for
the rest of my life the meetings we had together, where he would nod
his (dis)approval in a simple manner. I must admit that it took me
some time to adapt to working with Arthur. I ﬁrst had to get used
to some Dutch subtleties lost in their English translations (the real
English, not the American one). I had to learn that "it is ﬁne" means
"it really needs more work" and that "it is good" means "it is great".
Pretty much everything I know in econometrics was taught to me with
his pedagogical catch-phrase: "I am not sure about this", which can
roughly be translated as "see, you are wrong here".
I am also grateful to those who ﬁrst fuelled my zealous love for
research: Charles and Sabine. They believed in my skills enough to
help me start a real research career. I will always be indebted to them
for giving me the opportunity to study in a good PhD programme –
or as some call it in Tilburg, a top programme.
I also want to thank the members of my doctoral committee who
provided a lot of insightful comments. Two members of the committee
did not co-author this thesis, meaning that they got to read the whole
thing without any direct beneﬁts. After reading all the chapters of this
dissertation and our very thick Netspar Panel Paper #18, Rob ofﬁcially
became my "main readership", having read pretty much everything
that I ever wrote in my short academic life. Martin, who was also
on the committee for my formerly-known-as-m-phil-thesis, is a close
ixsecond place. Martin was also of great moral support while I was
working on my thesis, but he got a nice cookbook and some advices
on wines in exchange, so I’d say we are even for that part. The last
member of my committee, Pierre-Carl, deserves special thanks namely
for inviting me to spend a few much-needed months under the sun
in Southern California and for a few drinks at Rick’s. I also take this
opportunity to thank Michael Hurd and the team of researchers who
welcomed me at RAND for their hospitality.
Long after my memory will erase the taste of croquettes or forget
the Dutch obsession with cheap satay sauce, I hope that I will re-
member all the kind people who made my academic life a little less
depressing. I got to live with a lot of ofﬁcemates, and I want to thank
Fangfang’s epic zeal, Cristina’s inﬁnite kindness, Juan Juan’s (or was
it Ms. Kai?) shy cleverness, Hanka’s sweet "unappropriateness" (and
questionable driving skills), Salvatore’s elusive presence and WeoJong
Kim. Beyond the boundaries of my various ofﬁces, I cannot stay silent
about David’s sharp sarcasm, Jan’s unshakable enthusiasm, Marco’s
under-appreciated genius, Rasa’s timid intellect, Guillaume’s quiet
wisdom, Ting’s lively philosophy, Jarda’s energetic joie de vivre (and
unhealthy TV addiction), Peter’s fast-paced English (even compared
to mine), and Ying’s cheerful spirit. Some special thanks to Lisanne,
Mohammed, Patrick, Nathanael, Peter and all the "Welcoming Dutch"
who helped me understand this peculiar ﬂat land in which I landed.
Many young professors in Tilburg were of great support to me, and I
hope that Tobias, Otilia, and Meltem realize how much I valued their
help and support. I am particularly indebted to Katie, who took a lot
of her precious time to listen to my depressed whining and to guide
me in the fog of academic life.
Finally, this thesis would not exist without the support of my won-
derful life-partner Marie-France. She made even more sacriﬁces than I
did over these four years when she decided to come with me to live
in Tilburg. As I write these lines, we just passed the milestone of ten
happy years together. I clearly got the upper hand of this deal. My
parents, Gilles and Sylvie, were also very supportive (both morally
and ﬁnancially) through my 25-year career as a student. I am very
grateful for that too.
Some people say I leave Tilburg as an inconsiderate prodigal child.
I do not feel that way, and I am very grateful to those who helped me
become a better researcher. Besides I believe that a small part of me
will always stay in Tilburg. A small part of me I used to call "Sanity".
Thank you for reading me.
Luc Bissonnette
Québec, December 10, 2011
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INTRODUCTION
We all know that smoking increases mortality risks, but how dangerous
is smoking for our health? We also know that the world population is
aging, but what is the likely impact of this on our retirement plans?
What are the probabilities that we will be the victims of car theft
or robbery? Questions about uncertain consequences are important
when we decide whether to smoke or not, how much to save, or
whether or not to buy insurance. However, few of us are able to
provide accurate answers. As a matter of fact, every day we make
decisions under uncertainty without a perfect knowledge of the risks
we face. Each of us may have a different perception of the probability
of the realization of future events. These heterogeneous predictions
are known to economists as subjective expectations. The study of this
heterogeneity in expectations is the unifying theme of the chapters of
this thesis.
There are many factors explaining this heterogeneity. On the one
hand, we live in a complex reality and it is hard to accurately assess
all the probabilities needed to take important decisions. Agents will
typically not know, for example, the precise probability they will be
in a car accident or will have cancer, but will still decide to insure
themselves or not. On the other hand, they have a lot of private
information concerning their own driving habits or medical history,
and this information offers them the possibility to form more accurate
expectations than an outside observer without this knowledge. Even
if agents form objectively valid expectations, they may very well have
heterogenous expectations.
Despite the fairly uncontroversial view that there is heterogeneity in
expectations, the standard assumption in economics is that economic
agents are able to form what has been known as rational expectations
since the work by Muth (1961). The rational expectations assumption
implies that while economic agents cannot perfectly forecast the fu-
ture, they know the objectively valid distribution of uncertain events.
This assumption became a prominent part of the economic literature,
particularly with the work of macroeconomists like Lucas (see Pesaran,
1987, for a discussion). Skepticism concerning rational expectations
is not a new concern in economics. An early discussion of the matter
can be found in an essay by the mathematician Ramsey (1926) entitled
Truth and Probability.1 In his essay, Ramsey wanted to contrast his per-
sonal view that people were not able to form accurate beliefs with the
1 The essay, written in 1926, was published posthumously in 1931 as a chapter in The
Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays.
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view held by Keynes that they could form objectively valid beliefs. He
wrote:
Mr Keynes2 starts from the supposition that we make prob-
able inferences for which we claim objective validity; we
proceed from full belief in one proposition to partial belief
in another, and we claim that this procedure is objectively
right, so that if another man in similar circumstances en-
tertained a different degree of belief, he would be wrong
in doing so. [...]
[A fundamental criticism of Mr Keynes’ views] is the obvi-
ous one that there really do not seem to be any such things
as the probability relations he describes. He supposes that,
at any rate in certain cases, they can be perceived; but
speaking for myself I feel conﬁdent that this is not true.
I do not perceive them, and if I am to be persuaded that
they exist it must be by argument... [pp. 160-161]
Ramsey’s view that there is no such thing as an intrinsic process
linking precisely objective realities and subjective probabilities may
sound trivial for those who never studied economics. I suspect most
individuals to feel like him: if I cannot form rational beliefs, why
would others be able to? Why assume that expectations are rational
when we have compelling evidence that individuals do not have such
accurate beliefs?
One of the reasons for relying on the rational expectations assump-
tion in empirical analysis is that data on expectations are rarely avail-
able.3 Beliefs are never directly observed and can usually not be
inferred by simply observing the agents’ choices. Because many com-
binations of preferences and beliefs may lead to the same decision, it
is impossible to disentangle the effects of these two components on
the decision process. This point was illustrated by Manski (2002), who
studied the identiﬁcation of a model of decision making in a simple
experimental game of proposal and response. If it is impossible to dis-
entangle expectations and preferences, assumptions on expectations
are needed in order to estimate preference parameters. In most cases,
the rational expectations assumption is seen as a plausible assumption,
or at least as the most plausible one. In some cases, parametric as-
sumptions can allow for heterogeneity in beliefs (e.g. Rust and Phelan,
1997), but as pointed out by Bernheim (1989), however, identiﬁcation
in such cases relies solely on the functional form. An approach with
weaker assumptions that would allow direct identiﬁcation of the role
2 J.M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (1921), footnote from the original citation.
3 Another simple reason that comes to mind is that the rational expectation hypothesis
simpliﬁes many problems and leads to elegant analytical solutions in theory. Given
that the core focus of this thesis is empirical, I will omit this aspect from the discussion.introduction 3
of beliefs in a decision requires additional information on subjective
expectations. However, beliefs are rarely observed.
To solve the problem that expectations are usually unobserved,
a recent strand in the empirical micro-economic literature aims at
measuring expectations directly using survey questions (see Manski,
2004, for a review of this topic). While expectations data have been
studied for some time (e.g. Hall and Johnson, 1980; Hamermesh, 1985),
elicitation of expectation data became an increasingly important ﬁeld
in economics since the early 1990s, mostly due to the contribution of
Manski (e.g. 1990; 1993). In these studies, survey respondents are asked
explicitly to report the probability that a certain outcome will realize.
This information on individual beliefs allows the role of expectations
in an economic model to be isolated, which in turn makes it possible
to identify preferences parameters in an econometric estimation. My
thesis contains papers that were built on this precept: that it is possible
to study empirically subjective expectations based on subjective data.
As I write these lines, papers on subjective expectations are a ﬂour-
ishing part of the economic literature. Reviewing all the work done in
this ﬁeld is clearly beyond the scope of this Introduction. There are
now more and more surveys eliciting information on subjective expec-
tations and some of these important surveys, such as the HRS, have
included probability questions on this type for almost two decades
(see Hurd, 2009, for a review concerning the HRS). In some cases, the
realizations corresponding to these forward-looking questions are now
known, and it is possible to discuss whether or not expectations were
accurate. While the question of whether or not expectations can be
characterized as rational is still part of the new literature (e.g. Benítez-
Silva, Dwyer, Gayle, and Muench, 2008), the idea that agents do not
necessarily form objectively valid expectations is now widely accepted,
which has led to many additional research topics. Researchers are
interested to know if expectations, beyond their rationality, have pre-
dictive power for the observed outcome (e.g. Hurd and McGarry,
2002) or whether subjective expectations help to predict behavior that
should be affected by these beliefs (e.g. Nyarko and Schotter, 2002).
Some papers focus on practical issues such as how to elicit subjective
expectations (e.g. Delavande and Rohwedder, 2008), others develop
econometric methods to analyze elicited subjective expectations (e.g.
Dominitz and Manski, 1996) or to take into account measurement er-
rors in reporting and rounding of answers (e.g. Manski and Molinari,
2010; Kleinjans and van Soest, 2010).
This dissertation contains ﬁve core chapters. The research questions
are in line with those mentioned above. In some chapters, we are
interested in the study of expectations per se and study, for instance,
who are the individuals expressing higher probabilities that a given
outcome will realize. Many of the chapters discuss important econo-
metric issues in the analysis of subjective expectations, proposing4 introduction
ways to estimate models with subjective expectations or discussing
the importance of subjective expectations to identify key preference
parameters of a model. In some cases, the implication of heterogeneity
in subjective beliefs for relevant economic decisions will be discussed.
One chapter proposes a test of rational expectations. Finally, one chap-
ter discusses an approach to estimate a model without having to elicit
various subjective expectations that would usually cause problems.
The thesis is divided into two parts, discussed below in more detail.
The ﬁrst part, grouping two of the ﬁve chapters, contains work where
the main focus is the analysis of subjective expectations from the point
of view of an applied econometrician. In the second part, the focus is
on the use of subjective expectations and subjective data in the ﬁeld of
the economics of aging.
Part I: Essays on the econometrics of subjective expectations
The ﬁrst part of this thesis includes the two chapters written jointly
with my supervisors during my years as a masters student in Québec
City, Charles Bellemare and Sabine Kröger. In essence, these chapters
are concerned with methodological issues concerning the analysis of
subjective expectations, more than with the study of expectations per
se.
Chapter 2 introduces a ﬂexible method to estimate a subjective prob-
ability distribution function when many points along this distribution
are observed. Prior to this reasearch, the most common way to esti-
mate these distributions, proposed by Dominitz and Manski (1996),
was to assume a parametric distribution and to ﬁnd the parameters
leading to the distribution with the best ﬁt to the available points. We
propose a more ﬂexible, nonparametric approach relying on weaker
assumptions: an intrapolation with cubic splines. We show that this
method is robust to measurement errors due to rounding, performs
almost as well as efﬁcient non-linear least squares estimation when the
correct parametric distribution is known, and outperforms non-linear
least squares estimation when the wrong parametric assumption is
chosen.
Chapter 3 is a discussion of the identiﬁcation power of various
assumptions on beliefs in a simple model of decision making in an
experimental game. Experimental economics, by the simplicity of the
decisions involved, is an interesting setting to study the role of subjec-
tive expectations in decision making (e.g. Nyarko and Schotter, 2002;
Bellemare, Kröger, and van Soest, 2008).The decision of interest is the
behavior of a participant who has to decide whether to invest or not
in a simple investment game inspired by the protocol of Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe (1995). We compare the identiﬁcation of the model under
various assumptions, and show that unless we observe the heteroge-introduction 5
neous subjective beliefs, we can only have partial identiﬁcation – even
under the assumption of rational expectations.
Part II: Subjective beliefs and economics of aging
The second part of the thesis, grouping Chapters 4, 5, and 6, focuses on
the analysis of subjective expectations in the economics of aging. The
economics of aging is one of the ﬁelds where the study of subjective
expectations represents an important part of current research (see
Hurd, 2009; Bissonnette and van Soest, 2010, for reviews on this topic).
This is not surprising since, because of the inter-temporal nature of
the many topics studied in this discipline, beliefs play a key role. For
instance, an individual’s expectations concerning his retirement age
or his life-expectancy are important factors in decisions to save for
retirement. Moreover, as may countries are moving away from deﬁned
beneﬁts plans to deﬁned contribution plans, the burden of decisions
concerning retirement plans requires a level of ﬁnancial knowledge
that is neither trivial nor, in many cases, part of the standard cur-
riculum at school. Research on ﬁnancial literacy shows that many
respondents do not understand this complex economic world (see
for instance Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). This lack of ﬁnancial knowl-
edge may lead to erroneous expectations, which may in turn lead to
suboptimal saving decisions.
The idea that respondents may have heterogeneous beliefs concern-
ing their pensions is the topic studied in Chapter 4. This chapter is
based on joint work with Arthur van Soest. In this chapter we study
how expectations concerning changes in social security vary over time
and among socio-economic and demographic groups. We show that
despite the fact that many respondents adapt their beliefs concern-
ing an upcoming reform of the Dutch public pension system, some
individuals in the population put themselves at risk, not being able to
forecast coming changes.
Expectations of life-expectancy is the central theme of Chapter 5,
written jointly with Michael Hurd and Pierre-Carl Michaud. In this
chapter, we try to characterize the full subjective survival curves (i.e.
the probability of survival as a function of age) of survey respondents
based on their self-reported survival at a target age. This paper is
an extension of the model introduced by Gan, Hurd, and McFadden
(2005). Our main contribution is to develop a procedure relying on
within-sample mortality rather than on nationally representative life-
tables. Doing so allows us to avoid a selection problem that occurs
if survey respondents do not have nationally representative mortal-
ity risks and allows us to include a socio-economic gradient even in
cases where life-tables are not published (e.g. assessing mortality by
education level). As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, part
of the private information that we have may lead to the formation of6 introduction
beliefs that are rational at the individual level, despite being different
from what we can observe at the aggregated level. Some individuals
have better objective survival probabilities than others. It has already
been shown that the subjective survival probabilities were predictive
of one’s survival status (Hurd and McGarry, 2002). In this chapter,
we develop a way to test whether subgroups of the population are
rational. Our approach is to compare objective mortality risk within
our sample with self-reported survival probabilities. We ﬁnd a gen-
eral optimism in the population, mostly driven by a group of very
optimistic respondents not matched by a group of equally pessimistic
respondents.
The last chapter about stated-preferences, Chapter 6, is rather differ-
ent in nature from the others. This chapter uses stated-preference data
to estimate a simple model of retirement and savings. Respondents
were asked to evaluate a series of retirement scenarios, stating their
preferences concerning retirement plans. These simple scenarios were
written in a way that ruled out most of the uncertainty faced by the
respondents. As a matter of fact, this chapter took its root precisely
from the fact that there is no need to characterize expectations held
by the respondents, allowing for estimation of preferences without
having to be concerned that decisions may be inﬂuenced by other
factors. Therefore, I end the thesis with an alternative solution to the
estimation of models where heterogeneity in expectations, rational or
not, may lead to biased estimates of preference parameters. The main
objective of the paper is to assess the implications of the hypothetical
scenarios in terms of a life-cycle model. To illustrate the results, I sim-
ulate a delay of two years in eligibility to social security and predict
the variation in current savings and delay in retirement for the survey
respondents. The main conclusion from this chapter is that the use
of stated preferences leads to plausible estimates of all parameters of
interest. Using these data, I ﬁnd a discount factor between 0.95 and
0.97 and a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion around 1.15, in line with
estimates from Hurd (1989). It would be interesting, in future work,
to validate that respondents’ stated preferences are correlated with
their actual behavior and to assess if combining stated preferences
with more traditional revealed preferences can help in estimating a
more traditional retirement model.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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IN WHICH I DISCUSS SOME ECONOMETRIC
IMPLICATIONS AND TREATMENTS OF
SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS2
FLEXIBLE APPROXIMATION OF SUBJECTIVE
EXPECTATIONS USING PROBABILITY QUESTIONS
This chapter is the reproduction of a paper written with Charles
Bellemare and Sabine Kröger and forthcoming in the Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics.
2.1 introduction
The measurement of subjective expectations has proven useful for
eliciting knowledge of economic agents and experts on the future
realization of various economic variables (e.g., Dominitz and Manski
(1997); Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009)) and improving the
empirical content of stochastic models of choice under uncertainty
(Delavande (2008); Bellemare, Kröger, and van Soest (2008)). It has
been advocated that the measurement of expectations should proceed
by ﬁrst measuring subjective probability distributions. In particular,
there is growing evidence that agents reveal different points of their
subjective distribution (mean, median, or other quantiles) when asked
for their best point prediction of a future event (see Manski (2004) for a
review). Thus, deriving expectations from probability distributions can
improve interpersonal comparisons while providing more information
on the uncertainty faced by respondents.
Up to now, two approaches have been used to make inferences
on subjective distributions. The ﬁrst approach is parametric and as-
sumes that the subjective distribution of a respondent is drawn from a
parametric distribution (e.g., a normal or lognormal distribution) that
depends on a ﬁnite number of unknown parameters. As with most
parametric approaches, misspeciﬁcation of the underlying distribution
may lead to biased forecasts and inferences. The second approach is
fully nonparametric, placing no restriction of the nature or shape of
subjective distributions. This approach overcomes potentials biases
due to misspeciﬁcation of the underlying distribution at the expense
of providing set rather than point identiﬁcation of the functionals of
interest.
In this paper, we present a ﬂexible method that yields point identiﬁ-
cation of the distribution function of a respondent while maintaining
weak assumptions on the shape of the underlying distribution. The
ﬂexible approach builds on cubic spline interpolation, which requires
only that the underlying distributions be twice differentiable on their
support. Moreover, the estimation by cubic splines involves solving
a system of linear equations. Thus our ﬂexible approach provides a
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simple analytical solution for the estimated function. Cubic splines
are well-known interpolation methods (see e.g., Judd (1998)); how-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, they have not been applied to ﬁt
individual speciﬁc cumulative distribution functions using subjective
expectations data. The closest work using interpolation methods to
ﬁt a cumulative distribution function is that of Kriström (1990), who
estimated the population-level distribution of willingness to pay for an
environmental good using linear interpolation and aggregated survey
responses to valuation questions.
We illustrate our approach by revisiting the determinants of ex-
pectations concerning future income using data from the Survey of
Economic Expectations (SEE). These data are characterized by high
levels of censoring and potential rounding. Censoring occurs when
individuals report a nonzero probability that the future outcome will
fall outside the range of potential values spanned by the probabil-
ity questions. The parametric approach maintains sufﬁciently strong
distributional assumptions to deal with censoring. In contrast, the
ﬂexible approach maintains weaker distributional assumptions. As
a result, estimated moments will be affected by censoring. To over-
come this problem, we propose a quantile-based ﬂexible approach
that uses the estimated median as a measure of central tendency and
the estimated interquartile range (IQR) as a measure of respondent
uncertainty. We compare estimators of the determinants of expecta-
tions and uncertainty using both a speciﬁc parametric approach and
our quantile-based ﬂexible approach. We ﬁnd that both approaches
provide similar results for most determinants of future income, sug-
gesting that the distributional assumptions chosen to implement the
parametric approach are reasonable.
In the ﬁnal part of the article, we present a Monte Carlo analysis
designed to measure the impact of censoring and rounding on esti-
mates of the determinants of expectations. We focus on comparing the
performance of our ﬂexible approach with that of a correctly speciﬁed
parametric approach as well as an incorrectly speciﬁed parametric
approach. We ﬁnd that the ﬂexible approach generates unbiased es-
timates of the determinants of expectations. This result holds when
we introduce censoring and rounding levels believed to be present
in the data. Moreover, the performance of the ﬂexible approach is
comparable to that of the correctly speciﬁed parametric approach but
clearly outperforms the incorrectly speciﬁed parametric approach that
we consider.
2.2 a flexible approach
Our objective is to approximate the subjective probability distribution
Fi(z) = Pri(Z  z) of a respondent i using his or her answers to J
probability questions of the type "what is the percent chance that Z2.2 a flexible approach 13
is less than or equal to zj?", where z1 < z2 < ... < zJ are threshold
values. Thus the J data points available to make inferences on Fi(z)
are f(z1, Fi (z1)),...,(zJ, Fi (zJ))g, where 0  Fi(zj)  1 denotes the
probability statement to a question with threshold zj. Censoring occurs
when Fi (z1) > 0 and/or 1   Fi (zJ) > 0. This implies that some
probability mass is not contained within the interval [z1,zJ].
We propose to use the available data to approximate the subjec-
tive cumulative distribution function Fi(z) using cubic spline inter-
polation. A cubic spline is a piecewise polynomial function deﬁned
on J   1 intervals, [z1,z2],..., [zJ 1,zJ]. On each interval, the function
Fi(z) is assumed to be given by a polynomial aj + bjz + cjz2 + djz3,
where (aj,bj,cj,dj) are the interval-speciﬁc polynomial coefﬁcients.
The spline approximation of the function Fi(z) is constructed by sim-
ply connecting the different polynomials at the relevant threshold
values. The set

(aj,bj,cj,dj) : j = 1,..., J   1
	
contains the 4(J   1)
unknown polynomial coefﬁcients to be estimated. Exploiting continu-
ity at the endpoints and interior thresholds provides 2J   2 equations
Fi(zj) = aj + bjzj + cjz2
j + djz3
j for j = 2,..., J   1
Fi(zj) = aj+1 + bj+1zj + cj+1z2
j + dj+1z3
j for j = 2,..., J   1
Fi(z1) = a1 + b1z1 + c1z2
1 + d1z3
1
Fi(zJ) = aJ 1 + bJ 1zJ + cJ 1z2
J + dJ 1z3
J
Next, restrictions that the ﬁrst and second derivatives of Fi() agree at
the interior thresholds generates 2J   4 additional equations
bj + 2cjzj + 3djz2
j = bj+1 + 2cj+1zj + 3dj+1z2
j for j = 2,..., J   1
2cj + 6djzj = 2cj+1 + 6dj+1zj for j = 2,..., J   1.
Two more conditions, so-called "boundary conditions" at the endpoints,
are needed to estimate the 4(J  1) polynomial coefﬁcients of the cubic
spline. There is very little guidance in the literature to chose these
boundary conditions. Here we chose to impose that F00
i (z1) = F00
i (zJ) =
0, yielding what is known in the literature as a natural cubic spline (see
Judd (1998)). Thus restrictions on the derivatives and the boundary
conditions generate a system of 4(J   1) linear equations that can be
solved for the 4(J   1) unknown parameters. We experimented with
boundary conditions restricting the ﬁrst derivative at both endpoints
F0
i(z1) = F0
i(zJ) = 0 or by mixing restrictions on ﬁrst and second
derivatives (e.g., setting F00
i (z1) = F0
i(zJ) = 0 or F0
i(z1) = F00
i (zJ) = 0).
We found that these changes had only minor effects on the estimated
splines. We also experimented with linear and quadratic splines and
found the cubic spline approximation to be superior. We did not ﬁnd
that increasing the order of the spline further increased the quality of
the approximation. Thus, we use natural cubic splines throughout the
rest of the article.14 Flexible Approximation of Subjective Expectations
Absent censoring, moments can be directly estimated from the
ﬁtted subjective cumulative distribution function. In particular, the
























h(z)dFi(z) of a general function h()
is slightly more complicated. In such cases, numerical integration
can be performed by quadrature or simulation using b Fi(z). Similarly,
quantiles can be obtained numerically by inverting b Fi(z). Quantiles
are especially useful in the presence of censoring, which occurs when
survey respondents report a nonzero probability that Z will fall below
z1 and/or above zJ. In such cases, relevant medians can be used as
a measure of central tendency, and the interquartile range (IQR) can
be computed as a measure of subjective uncertainty as long as Fi (z1)
and 1  Fi (zJ) are less than or equal to 0.25.
We illustrate the ﬂexible approach by ﬁtting three different distri-
butions: a symmetric standard normal, an asymmetric chi-squared
distribution with 3 degrees of freedom, and a bimodal distribution
(with modes at p/2 and 5p/2). The density of the bimodal distribu-
tion is given by
sin(z)+1
A over the [0,3p] interval, where A = 2 + 3p
ensures that the function integrates to 1 over its domain. We ﬁtted
each cumulative distribution function using between four and six data
points equally spaced between 3 and -3 for the normal distribution,
between 0 and 8 for the chi-squared distribution, and between 0 and
3p for the bimodal distribution. The results are reported in Figure
2.1. As expected, the goodness of ﬁt increases with the number of
data points for all three interpolations. A slight approximation error
remains in the lower hand of the distribution when the number of data
points is increased from four to six. Finally, we ﬁnd that the approach
has more difﬁculty ﬁtting the bimodal distribution than the other two
distributions. In contrast, the interpolation manages to provide a very
good ﬁt of the distribution with ﬁve or more data points.
Monotonicity
Cubic spline interpolation can produce oscillations that can cause the
estimated distribution function to be nonmonotonically increasing.
This is particularly problematic when estimating quantiles by inverting
b Fi() to obtain a unique solution. Perhaps the simplest and most effec-
tive way to correct for these oscillations is to use the Hyman ﬁlter (Hy-
man (1983)). This ﬁlter works in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, deﬁne b f 0
i(zj)
as the estimated value of the ﬁrst derivative of the spline function at
the threshold zj. Next, deﬁne Si 1/2 = (b Fi(zj)   b Fi(zj 1))/(zj   zj 1)









































































Figure 2.1: Fitted normal, chi-squared and sinus distributions using cubic
spline interpolations with four to six data points (questions).
The solid lines represent the true distributions. The dashed lines
represent the ﬁtted distributions using the data points (dark
points).
necting with the previous threshold, (b Fi(zj 1),zj 1), and the right-side
slope connecting with the threshold (b Fi(zj+1),zj+1). Boor and Swartz
(1977) have shown that if an estimated function satisﬁes the criteria
0  b f 0
i(zj)  3min(Si 1/2,Si+1/2), (2.2)
then it is monotone on the interval [zj,zj+1]. Thus the criteria (2.2)
can be used to identify all points where the monotonicity condition is
violated. In a second step, the condition of the equality of the second















Hyman (1983) compared his ﬁlter approach to correct for nonmono-
tonicity with various alternative spline methods (e.g., Akima splines)16 Flexible Approximation of Subjective Expectations
and found that cubic spline interpolation coupled with his ﬁlter is
the most effective method (in a mean squared error sense) to impose
monotonicity on an estimated function.
2.3 revisiting expectations of future income
In this section we illustrate the ﬂexible approach by revisiting data
on income expectations that were previously analyzed in a paramet-
ric setting by Dominitz (2001). Data are taken from the 1994-1995
SEE administered through WISCON, a national telephone survey con-
ducted by the University of Wisconsin Survey Center. We focus on the
following survey question:
What do you think is the percent chance (or chances out of 100)
that your own total income, before taxes, will be under $zj (in
the next 12 months)?
For each respondent, four initial thresholds zj were selected based on
self-reported minimal and maximal values for their income support.
Respondents could then be asked one or two additional questions
based on their four answers. A detailed description of the branching
algorithm to determine the income level or additional questions was
presented by Dominitz (2001). We observe between four and six data
points for each of 1,249 respondents in the SEE aged 25-59 who were
active in the labor force at the time they answered the SEE and who
provided all of the information for our analysis.
Figure 2.2 documents the extent of censoring in these data by plot-
ting the sample distributions of Fi(z1,i) and Fi(zJ,i). We ﬁnd that only
44% of respondents have uncensored distributions at the lower end
(Fi(z1,i) = 0 in the left panel), whereas 66% of respondents have uncen-
sored distributions at the upper hand (Fi(zJ,i) = 1 in the right panel).
Only 37% of all sample respondents have uncensored distributions
at both ends, a proportion too low to perform meaningful inferences
using predicted moments. We deal with censoring by using the me-
dian as the measure of central tendency and the IQR as the measure
of dispersion. Note that a small subsample of respondents have Fi(z1,i)
or 1   Fi(zJ,i) exceeding 0.25 and (to a lesser extent) exceeding 0.5;
thus the estimated medians and/or IQR of respondents in this sub-
sample are potentially biased. We report a Monte Carlo analysis to
assess how such biases affect the measurement of the determinants of
expectations.
We compared estimates using our proposed quantile-based ﬂexible
approach with those of a parametric approach applied to the same
data. The parametric approach involves ﬁtting the best lognormal
distribution when sufﬁcient data points are available. Respondents
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Fi(z1,i) (left) and Fi(zJ,i) (right) in the SEE data
(N=1249). Dashed lines are at 0.25 (left) and 0.75 (right).
with the best log-triangular distribution, following the procedure of
Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009).
We applied the Hyman ﬁlter for 850 respondents (68%) to correct for
nonmonotonicity of the cumulative distribution function predicted by
the ﬂexible approach. Figure 2.3 presents a scatterplot of the predicted
medians (left panel) and IQR (right panel) using both approaches
(the ﬂexible on the horizontal axis and the parametric on the vertical
axis). We found similar predicted medians for both approaches, with
predictions scattering closely and relatively equally below and above
the 45-degree line. More important differences emerge when looking
at the predicted IQR. There the ﬂexible method tends to predict higher
dispersions (74.5% of predicted IQR are below the 45-degree line).
We next estimated linear models for both approaches using the
predicted medians and IQR as dependent variables and using a set
of independent variables including realized income in the last year,
basic demographic characteristics, employment status, and education
level (using no high school diploma as the reference class). The ﬁrst
column of Table 2.1 presents some sample descriptive statistics of these
variables. We estimated our models using the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimator with robust standard errors. Results are presented in
subsequent columns of Table 2.1.
Overall, inferences using the ﬂexible and parametric approaches are
similar, suggesting that the assumption of expected income following
a lognormal distribution is reasonable. Only small differences emerge.
For instance, the ﬂexible approach predicts that women and Hispanics
expect signiﬁcantly lower average median future income. Both meth-18 Flexible Approximation of Subjective Expectations
Desc. Stat. Median IQR 75-25
Mean (S.D.) Param. Flexible Param. Flexible
Income 36.592 0.841*** 0.828*** 0.225*** 0.295***
(32.999) (0.063) (0.052) (0.039) (0.040)
Self-employed 0.123 4.201** 3.206* 12.910*** 9.579***
(0.329) (2.019) (1.887) (2.446) (1.364)
Currently unemployed 0.059 0.272 -0.336 -4.031*** -1.291
(0.236) (1.897) (1.431) (1.271) (1.140)
Previously unemployed 0.117 -3.956*** -3.532*** 2.332 4.137***
(0.321) (1.315) (1.193) (1.694) (1.446)
Female 0.467 -2.217 -2.756** 0.808 0.474
(0.499) (1.360) (1.246) (1.301) (0.820)
Partner 0.651 0.440 1.226 -1.909 -0.357
(0.477) (0.867) (0.757) (1.421) (0.720)
Age 39.001 -0.008 0.036 -0.216*** -0.159***
(9.155) (0.049) (0.041) (0.068) (0.045)
White 0.877 -0.113 -0.340 -0.415 -1.624
(0.329) (1.539) (1.459) (1.659) (1.360)
Black 0.067 0.516 -0.933 8.640** 2.222
(0.251) (2.258) (2.001) (4.227) (1.685)
Hispanic 0.031 -3.080 -4.672** 4.296 -0.529
(0.174) (2.475) (2.088) (6.392) (2.182)
High school diploma 0.164 -0.746 -0.813 -3.205 0.149
(0.371) (2.400) (2.306) (4.290) (1.428)
Att. college w/o graduating 0.431 0.859 0.871 -2.028 0.619
(0.495) (2.344) (2.255) (4.202) (1.355)
College graduate 0.365 5.139** 5.309** -2.649 -1.326
( 0.482) (2.598) (2.449) (4.172) (1.534)
Constant 7.454** 6.117** 13.626*** 7.019***
(3.183) (3.046) (4.972) (2.277)
R2 0.775 0.804 0.146 0.421
N 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249
Standard errors in parentheses (Eicker-White used in OLS estimation).
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level
Table 2.1: Determinants of subjective medians and IQR in the SEE using the
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Figure 2.3: Scatterplot of estimated medians (left) and IQRs (right) of sub-
jective income expectations, with either the parametric (vertical
axis) or ﬂexible (horizontal axis) method (N=1249). The dashed
line represents the 45-degree line.
ods yield different results concerning the effect of unemployment on
the uncertainty of future income and the income uncertainty faced
by African-Americans. Results of the parametric approach suggest
that the currently unemployed face signiﬁcantly lower income un-
certainty, whereas results of the ﬂexible approach indicate that the
previously unemployed have signiﬁcantly higher income uncertainty.
The parametric approach ﬁnds that African-American respondents
have signiﬁcantly greater income uncertainty, whereas this effect is
smaller and insigniﬁcant using the ﬂexible approach.
2.3.1 Monte Carlo analysis
We conducted a Monte Carlo analysis to assess how censoring and
possible rounding in the SEE income data can affect the results in our
application. Out analysis focuses on comparing the performance of our
proposed ﬂexible approach with the performance of the parametric
approach, using both correctly speciﬁed and misspeciﬁed distribution
functions for the parametric approach. We begin by specifying the
data-generating process of medians medi and interquartile ranges
IQRi
medi = q0 + q1x1i + #i (2.3)
IQRi = g0 + g1x2i + hi, (2.4)
where x1i and x2i are two determinants, and where #i and hi denote
homoscedastic unobserved heterogeneity. Our objective is to analyze20 Flexible Approximation of Subjective Expectations
the properties of the OLS estimator of (q0,q1,g0,g1)
0 in the presence
of censoring and rounding. To proceed, we specify (2.3) and (2.4)
as equations generating quantiles of a Kumaraswamy distribution
deﬁned over the [0,1] interval with parameters (ai  0, bi  0). The
Kumaraswamy distribution is sufﬁciently ﬂexible to accommodate a
wide range of symmetric and asymmetric distributions of potential
outcomes (Kumaraswamy (1980)). For example, (ai = 2, bi = 2) im-
plies a symmetric distribution centered at 0.5, whereas (ai = 1, bi = 5)
produces a severely left-skewed distribution with mode at 0.2. We spec-
ify our data-generating process in the following way. First, values of x1i
and x2i are drawn from a uniform distribution on the [-0.5,0.5] interval,
whereas values of #i and hi are each drawn from a standard normal
distribution with mean 0 truncated to the [-0.1,0.1] interval. Finally,
we set (q0 = 0.5,q1 = 0.3,g0 = 0.5,g1 = 0.3,). These data-generating
processes force both medi and IQRi to lie within [0.25,0.75]. We next
present in detail the steps performed in our Monte Carlo simulations.
Our analysis of the ﬂexible and parametric approaches differs only
with respect to step 4.
Step 1. Draw (medi, IQRi) for i = 1,2,..., N using eqs. (2.3) and
(2.4).
Step 2. Compute for each i the parameters (ai, bi) corresponding
Kumaraswamy distribution by numerically solving the following sys-
tem of equations:
medi = Q0.5(ai, bi) (2.5)
IQRi = Q0.75(ai, bi)   Q0.25(ai, bi) (2.6)
such that Qk(ai, bi) = F 1(k;ai, bi) where F 1 () denotes the in-
verse mapping of the Kumaraswamy cumulative distribution function
F(x) = 1  (1  xai)bi evaluated at 0  k  1 with parameters (ai, bi).
Step 3. Generate points

zj,i : j = 2,..., J   1
	
using a branching
algorithm inspired by our empirical application. In particular, re-
spondents with medi  0.42 are assigned the vector of thresholds
(0,0.125,0.25,0.4,0.7,1), those with 0.42 < medi < 0.59 are assigned
thresholds (0,0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8,1), and those with medi  0.59 are assigned
thresholds (0,0.3,0.6,0.75,0.875,1). As with our empirical application,
this algorithm assumes that prior information about the location of





are computed at all zj,i values.
Step 4 (ﬂexible approach). Compute estimates d medi and d IQRi using
the ﬂexible approach.
Step 4 (parametric approach). Compute the value of d that mini-
mizes the following loss function:
b d = argmin
d å
 
Pr(Z  zj,i;d)   Fi(zj,i,r)
2 ,
where the summation is over the data points of respondent i and
Pr(Z  zj,i;d) denotes a parametric cumulative distribution function2.3 revisiting expectations of future income 21
with an unknown vector of parameters d. We consider the correctly
speciﬁed case where Pr(Z  zj,i;d) is correctly chosen to be the
Kumaraswamy distribution with parameters d = [ai, bi]. We also
consider a misspeciﬁed case where Pr(Y  zj,i;d) is chosen to be
the Normal distribution with mean ti and variance g2
i . We compute
estimates d medi and d IQRi using b d.
Step 5. Estimate the following equations:
d medi = q0 + q1xi + #i (2.7)
d IQRi = g0 + g1xi + hi, (2.8)
where #i = #i + d medi   medi and hi = hi + d IQRi   IQRi. Equations
(2.7) and (2.8) are identical to eqs. (2.3) and (2.4), except that the true
medians and IQRs are replaced by approximated values generated us-
ing either the parametric approach or the ﬂexible approach. Estimated
values

b q0, b q1
0
and (b g0, b g1)
0 are saved. We repeat steps 1-5 for 10,000
samples of size 100.
The foregoing ﬁve steps generate our baseline results without cen-





in step 3 by the closest of the following
numbers: 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85,
90, 95, 97, 98, 99, or 100. This sequence closely matches the probabil-
ity responses in our application. It also is one of the main rounding
patterns discussed in the literature (see Manski and Molinari (2010)).
To analyze the effects of censoring, we randomly draw for each
i a pair of censoring levels from below and from above using the
empirical distribution of censoring levels presented in Figure 2.2. Let
c0
i and c1
i denote these censoring levels. We then rescale the thresholds
assigned in step 3 such that z1,i = Qc0
i (ai, bi) and zJ,i = Q1 c1
i (ai, bi).
We evaluate the performance of the ﬂexible and parametric ap-
proaches with rounding and censoring by computing parameter and
standard error biases. Parameter bias is computed using ( 1
S å
S
s=1 b fs  
f)/f, where f 2 fq0,q1,g0,g1g are the true values and b fs denotes
the estimated parameter in simulation s  S = 10,000. We also




s=1 se(b fs)   sd(b fs))/sd(b fs), where sd(b fs) denotes the standard
deviation of all b fs and se(b fs) denotes the standard error predicted
using the covariance matrix of the OLS estimator with homoscedas-
ticity (s2(X0X) 1). Thus we report the percent difference between the
average standard error predicted by the OLS estimator and the actual
standard deviation of the estimates over the 10,000 simulations.
Table 2.2 presents the results. We see that under the baseline sce-
nario (no censoring or rounding), both parameter and standard error
biases are small and negligible for the ﬂexible and correctly speci-
ﬁed parametric approaches. Of note, these results also hold when
censoring and rounding levels believed to be present in our data are22 Flexible Approximation of Subjective Expectations
incorporated in the analysis. This suggests that results of our empiri-
cal application are robust to censoring and possible rounding in the
data. We also ﬁnd that our ﬂexible approach clearly outperforms the
misspeciﬁed parametric approach based on the erroneous assumption
that distributions are normal in the population. There parameter bias
is substantial: -24% for b q1, -17% for b g0, and -43% for b g1. These biases
are not affected by censoring and rounding.
2.4 conclusion and discussion
Our Monte Carlo analysis suggests that the quantile-based ﬂexible
approach is robust to levels of rounding discussed in the literature and
can accommodate censoring levels present in our data. We found that
the ﬂexible approach is comparable to a (ﬁrst-best) correctly speciﬁed
parametric approach in terms of bias and efﬁciency. Moreover, it clearly
outperforms the misspeciﬁed parametric approach that we consider.
We interpret these results as an indication that the ﬂexible approach
represents a potentially useful alternative to the existing parametric
approach when researchers have little prior knowledge of the shape
of the underlying distributions.
The ﬂexible approach has three limitations. First, it lacks a distribu-
tion theory which would allow one to make inferences on individual
speciﬁc distribution functions. This limitation might not pose a signiﬁ-
cant problem in practice, given that research on subjective expectations
has focused on making statistical inferences on the determinants on ex-
pectations rather than on individual distribution functions. A second
limitation is that moments are biased in the presence of censoring. This
is expected because the ﬂexible approach maintains weak assumptions
on the shape of the distribution, thereby preventing extrapolation
outside of the support spanned by the probability questions. Finally,
our quantile-based ﬂexible approach can accommodate only moderate
levels of censoring.
Greater levels of censoring can be dealt with in several ways. The
ﬁrst and simplest way is to drop observations with excessive censoring.
Though simple, this approach may introduce selection biases if the
observations dropped represent a nonrandom subset of observations.
A second way is to revert back to the parametric approach and main-
tain stronger distributional assumptions. Although this would allow
accounting for censoring in the data, adopting a fully parametric ap-
proach introduces possible speciﬁcation biases. Our analysis suggests
that such biases can be sizeable. Finally, the survey design could be
improved by designing probability questions to gather information on
a larger range of possible outcomes. The ﬂexible approach could then
be used to make inferences while maintaining weaker assumptions on
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BOUNDING PREFERENCE PARAMETERS UNDER
DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT BELIEFS: A
PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION APPROACH
This chapter is the reproduction of a paper written with Charles
Bellemare and Sabine Kröger and published in Experimental Economics
(2010).
3.1 introduction
A recent development in econometrics concerns the identiﬁcation
and estimation of econometric models that are partially identiﬁed
(see Manski and Tamer (2002)). A model is partially identiﬁed if it
maintains weaker assumptions than are necessary to point identify the
parameters of interest. The approach allows researchers to understand
what can be learned about a parameter of interest under different
sets of assumptions, some potentially more plausible than others.
Each set of assumptions can be used to place bounds around the
model parameters of interest. These bounds in turn deﬁne the so-
called identiﬁcation region of the model parameters that contains
all parameter vectors which are consistent with the data given the
maintained assumptions. The identiﬁcation regions can in turn be used
to perform speciﬁcation tests of the validity of maintaining stronger
assumptions to point identify the model parameters. In particular,
maintaining stronger but invalid assumptions concerning key variables
may yield point estimates that fall outside the identiﬁcation region
derived under weaker assumptions.
Early applications have focused on placing bounds around mo-
ments or quantiles of a conditional distribution (see Manski (1989,
1994)) . These applications are non-parametric in nature: identiﬁca-
tion regions around moments or quantiles are estimated using the
data alone without referring to a speciﬁc parametric model. More
recently, the approach has been extended to make inferences on pa-
rameters of incomplete parametric and semi-parametric models (see
Manski and Tamer (2002)). Applications of the later include Honoré
and Tamer (2006) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). To our knowledge,
these methods have yet to be applied to experimental data.
In this paper we illustrate the usefulness of these methods by making
inferences on preferences in a choice problem with uncertainty under
different assumptions about the beliefs of players.1 More speciﬁcally,
1 This paper relates to two approaches used so far to separately identify the effects
of preferences and beliefs on decision making under uncertainty. The ﬁrst approach
2728 Bounding Preference Parameters
we specify a simple model of sender behavior in a binary investment
game (see Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995)). We model decisions
of senders as a function of their expected ﬁnal payoffs (which proxies
their trust in the responder), a component capturing other-regarding
preferences, and an unobserved random component. We focus on
relating the size of the identiﬁcation regions to the restrictiveness of
the assumptions maintained on the beliefs of senders. We explore three
different sets of assumptions. The ﬁrst and weakest set of assumptions
states that researchers have no information about beliefs of senders
apart from the natural restrictions imposed by the game (e.g., the
amount returned must be below and above known boundaries). The
second set of assumptions states that all senders expect to receive
not less when they invest than when they do not. This second set is
more restrictive than the ﬁrst. As a result, we expect the identiﬁcation
region under the second set to be contained in the identiﬁcation
region derived under the ﬁrst set of assumptions. The third and most
restrictive set of assumptions we consider consists of assuming that
senders have rational expectations. We show that the latter set of
assumptions produce the smallest identiﬁcation region of the three we
consider. Finally, we point estimate our model parameters using non-
incentivized beliefs stated by senders in the experiment. Our point
estimates suggests that expectations about responder behavior as well
as other-regarding preferences are both signiﬁcant determinants of
investments. Moreover, we ﬁnd that our point estimates fall within the
ﬁrst two identiﬁcation regions. This suggests that reasonable inferences
on preferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents
the experimental design and the data. Section 3.3 the econometric
model. Section 3.4 presents our results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 experimental design and procedure
3.2.1 Experimental design
Our experimental design is a modiﬁed version of the two player invest-
ment game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). In our experiment,
senders and responders were both endowed with 6$US.2 Contrary to
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), we restricted the decision space of
senders to two choices: investing all or none of the endowment. If a
sender invested his endowment, that amount was doubled and added
to the endowment of the responder. In turn, the responder had the
compares behavior in treatments with uncertainty with behavior in treatments where
uncertainty is blocked by design (see, e.g., Cox (2004)). The second approach uses
data on subjective beliefs to recover estimates of preference parameters (see, e.g.,
Bellemare, Kröger, and van Soest (2008)).
2 The complete content of the computer screens can be downloaded from
http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/charles.bellemare/.3.2 experimental design and procedure 29
opportunity to return any amount from his augmented endowment
to the sender (i.e., he could return up to 18$).3 If the sender did not
invest his endowment, the responder could return any amount from
his initial endowment (up to 6$).
Responders made their decisions using the strategy method: they
each had to decide how much to return when the sender invested
his endowment, and how much to return when the sender would
not invest his endowment. The decision that corresponded to the
actual choice of the sender was chosen to be the effective action
and determined the payoff of both participants. After making their
decisions, senders were asked to state their subjective beliefs. Before
stating their beliefs, they were further reminded of the decision tasks
and given examples to clarify the belief elicitation procedure. Senders
were not rewarded for the accuracy of their beliefs.
Senders had to state their subjective beliefs in two scenarios. They
were ﬁrst asked to state their beliefs if they did not invest. In particular,
they had to state how many out of 100 responders would return 0$,
and how many would return amounts in the following intervals
f(0,1], (1,2], (2,3], (3,4], (4,5], (5,6]g.4 By allowing senders to place
a positive probability on getting back 0, we allow their subjective
distribution functions to be censored from below. Additionally, senders
were asked to state their beliefs about responder behavior if they
invested their endowment. Senders were asked to state how many
out of 100 responders would return 0$, and how many would return
amounts in the following intervals f(0,3], (3,6], (6,9], (9,12], (12,15],
(15,18]g.5,6
3.2.2 Experimental procedure
After all participants had made their decisions, senders and responders
were randomly matched and payoffs were computed based on the
decisions of the pair. Participants were then informed of the outcome of
3 Expending the choice set of senders is in principle possible, but this will require
asking each participant to answer many more questions on their beliefs (see below).
4 If the probability mass entered exceeded 100, senders where automatically instructed
to go back and adjust their answers.
5 In order to detect whether senders stated beliefs to rationalize their decisions, we
randomized approximately one third of all participants in our experiment to a group
of “observers” who did not make any decisions but who answered the belief questions
after having read the same instructions as all other participants. Observers received
each 6$ for their participation. We found no signiﬁcant differences between the beliefs
of senders and those of observers. See the extended working paper version of the
paper for details (Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kröger, 2007).
6 At the end of the experiment we elicited participants’ risk preferences. We asked
participants to play a sequence of lotteries similar to that proposed by Holt and
Laury (2002). We will not discuss those results further as we found no signiﬁcant
relationship between measured risk preferences and investment behavior. Similar
results have been reported by Eckel and Wilson (2004) and Houser, Schunk, and
Winter (2010).30 Bounding Preference Parameters
the experiment and their ﬁnal payoffs. The experiment was conducted
in May 2005 at the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of
Arizona using the software zTree (Fischbacher (2007)). Participants
were recruited via email and were mainly students in ﬁnance, business
administration, economics, and engineering. Participants received a
5$ show-up fee upon arrival at the laboratory. We observed 38 pairs of
players in 9 sessions of the experiment. An experimental session lasted
on average 60 minutes, and, including their show up fee, participants
earned on average 12.18$ (9.92$ for senders and 15.87$ for responders).
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics
24 of the 38 senders (63%) invested their endowment. To gain some
insights on whether investors and non-investors trusted responders
differently, we compare the subjective belief distributions of investors
with those of non-investors. Figure 3.1 presents the average subjective
belief distributions of investors (light bars, N = 24) and non investors
(dark bars, N = 14). We ﬁnd that both groups had similar beliefs about
responder behavior if they consider not investing their endowment.
In particular, both investors and non investors place on average a very
high probability of getting nothing back from responders. In fact, we
fail to ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between the distribution of beliefs of
investors and non-investors in each of the seven brackets of amounts
reported in Figure 3.1.7
Differences between both investors and non-investors emerge when
we look at their beliefs when investing their endowment. There, non-
investors placed a 48.3% probability on getting nothing back from
responders, substantially less than the 24.6% probability placed by
investors. A Mann-Whitney U test easily rejects the null hypothesis
that the distributions of beliefs about getting nothing back when
investing are the same (p-value = 0.012). Moreover, Mann-Whitney U
tests reject the null hypothesis that distributions of beliefs of investors
and non-investors for the interval (9,12] are the same (p-value = 0.050).
Together these results suggest that investors expect to get more when
investing their endowment than non-investors.8
To assess whether the beliefs of senders were rational, we computed
for each sender the deviation of their subjective expectations how
much the responder would return when they would invest (when
they would not invest) and the observed average amount returned for
this case 0.26$ (observed average when not investing: 3.66$). Figure
3.2 presents the distributions of these differences. We ﬁnd small dis-
crepancies between expectations and observed responses when not
7 We tested for each interval (0,(0,1],...) the null hypothesis the distributions of beliefs
are the same for investors and non-investors using a Mann-Whitney U test. The lowest
p-value out of the seven intervals tested is 0.238.
8 We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between the distributions of beliefs of both






































































































0 (0,3] (3,6] (6,9] (9,12](12,15] (15,18]
...when investing.
Non Investors Investors
Average subjective beliefs of investors and non investors...
Figure 3.1: Subjective beliefs about the amount returned separately for in-
vestors (light bars, N = 24) and non investors (dark bars, N = 14)
when not investing (left panel) and when investing (right panel).
investing, reﬂecting the fact that most senders correctly anticipated
that the probability of getting close to nothing would be high when not
investing. More substantial discrepancies emerge when considering
amounts returned when investing. There, we ﬁnd that a substantial
amount of senders have expectations below and above the observed
amount returned. Even though we fail to reject the Null hypothesis
that the median deviation is equal to zero in both cases (p-value =
0.545 when not investing and 0.354 when investing), we ﬁnd that the
25th and 75th percentiles of the distributions are signiﬁcantly different
from 0.9 Deviations observed in Figure 3.2 may also reﬂect noise rather
than genuine deviations from rational expectations. Separating noise
from true underlying beliefs is out of the scope of the paper. However,
if beliefs are mostly noise, they should be poorly related to decisions
of senders. This issue is discussed in the next section.
3.3 a simple model of choice
We assume that the utility of not investing for sender i is given by
u
keep
i = b(w + r
keep
i ), where r
keep
i denotes the amount the responder
returns to sender i when i does not invest, w denotes the initial
endowment of sender i, and b measures the marginal utility of income.
9 We reject the Null hypothesis that the deviation is equal to zero at the 25th and
75th percentiles for both scenarios (p-value=0.000 and 0.042 when not investing and
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Subjective expectations − average response
...when investing.
Difference between subjective expectations
and average response...
Figure 3.2: Distribution of the difference between subjective expectations of
all senders and observed average response of all responders in
the event of not investing (left graph, N = 38) and in the event of
investing (right graph, N = 38).
The amount returned when not investing r
keep
i can vary between 0 and
the endowment w = 6$ of the responder.
When sender i invests, he foregoes his endowment w which is then
doubled and transferred to the responder. As a result, a surplus of
w is created when investing. We model the utility of investing as
uinvest
i = brinvest
i + q, where rinvest
i denotes the amount returned by the
responder when investing,10 and q captures any utility gain coming
from some form of other regarding preferences, whether it is a concern
for efﬁciency or altruism.11 Recent studies suggest that concerns for
social efﬁciency may be particularly important (see Engelmann and
Strobel (2004)). In terms of our model, this would imply that q > 0.
We next assume that senders make their decisions by comparing
their subjective expected utilities of investing and not investing. The




























+ q + einvest
i , (3.2)
10 The amount returned rinvest
i by the responder can take a value between 0 and 3w =
18$.
11 The preferences presented here are equivalent to linear altruism (e.g., Andreoni and
Miller, 2002): ui = axi + gxj with b = a   g, q = g  3w where xi = rinvest and
xj = (3w   rinvest) denote income of player i and j. For the case of not investing,
g = 0. Our data does not allow us to identify more general preferences (for instance
as in Charness and Rabin (2002)).3.4 identification regions of the model parameters 33
where the expectations are computed with respect to the subjective dis-
tribution functions of sender i. To allow for the fact that some senders




i to the true expected utilities E(uinvest
i ) and E(u
keep
i ),





i rather than E(u
j
i).
3.4 identification regions of the model parameters
We ﬁrst characterize the identiﬁcation region of (b,q) that is consistent
with the observed choice distribution of senders without imposing
any information on beliefs. To estimate this region, we ﬁrst consider
the extreme case where all senders expect to receive with probability
1 the highest possible amount when investing (rinvest = 3w) and the
lowest possible amount when not investing (rkeep = 0). This gives rise
to the largest payoff difference between investing and not investing.









b(2w) + q + ei > 0. (3.3)
where ei = einvest
i   e
keep
i . A second extreme case occurs when all
senders expect to receive with probability 1 the lowest amount possible
when investing (rinvest = 0), and the highest possible amount when
they do not invest (rkeep = w). This gives rise to the smallest payoff
difference between investing and not investing. In this case, senders i
will invest when
b( 2w) + q + ei > 0. (3.4)
Assuming that errors ei are statistically independent of each other
and follow a standard normal distribution, aggregating inequalities
(3.3) and (3.4) across the population yields the following set of in-
equalities relating the population probability of investing to the model
parameters
F(b( 2w) + q)  Pr(invest)  F(b(2w) + q) (3.5)
where F() denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution. The
identiﬁcation region for (b,q) contains all vectors of parameters that
satisfy inequalities (3.5).
The shaded area in Figure 3.3 represents the identiﬁcation region
estimated by replacing Pr(invest) with the proportion of investments
observed in our sample. It is immediate from (3.5) that q is point-
identiﬁed and equal to F 1(Pr(invest)) when expectations have no
inﬂuence on the decision process (b = 0). Otherwise, the observed
proportion of investments is compatible with any combination of
b > 0 and q within the shaded area. We can easily see that the34 Bounding Preference Parameters
identiﬁcation region of the social preference parameter q increases
with b, the strength of the effect of expectations on investment behavior.






































Figure 3.3: Estimated identiﬁcation regions without information on subjec-




i ) (dark shaded area only), and under rational expectations
(dashed line). The point (ˆ b, ˆ q) denotes the parameter estimates
obtained using the subjective expectations data.
senders expect to receive when they invest at least or more than when
they do not (E(rinvest
i )  E(r
keep
i )). Under this assumption, inequality
(3.3) remains unchanged as it does not violate the new restriction
on beliefs. Inequality (3.4) on the other hand concerns the lowest
possible payoff difference, a difference of 0 under the new restriction
(E(rinvest
i ) = E(r
keep
i ). In this case, senders i will invest when
b( w) + q + ei > 0. (3.6)
Aggregating inequalities (3.3) and (3.6) across the population pro-
duces a new set of inequalities relating the population probability of
investing and the model parameters
F(b( w) + q)  Pr(invest)  F(b(2w) + q). (3.7)
The smaller identiﬁcation region derived from (3.7) is given by the
dark shaded area in the Figure 3.3. As expected, the new area is a
strict subset of the area derived previously as it places much tighter
upper bounds of the social preference parameter q.
Another way to reduce the size of the identiﬁcation region is to
assume that senders have objectively correct (rational) expectations.











both coincide with3.4 identification regions of the model parameters 35
observed average responder behavior, rinvest and rkeep, and are common
for all players. Then, the identiﬁcation region is a line, connecting all
values of b and q that solve
F

b(rinvest   rkeep)   bw + q

= Pr(invest). (3.8)
The dashed straight line in Figure 3.3 represents the estimated identiﬁ-
cation region obtained under the assumption that beliefs are rational,
estimated by replacing rinvest and rkeep with the corresponding sample
averages. We see that the assumption of rational expectations does
not point identify the model parameters. This follows because all
players are assumed to have the same information set. Hence, there
is no variation in beliefs across players that would be needed for the
point-identiﬁcation the model parameters.
In our experiment, however, participants have heterogeneous beliefs
(see section 3.2.3). This fact not only contradicts the rational expecta-
tion hypothesis but can be exploited to point identify the parameters.
To illustrate this, we ﬁnally estimate the parameters of our model
using the beliefs stated by each sender. To proceed, we replaced the
unknown expectations E(r
keep
i ) and E(rinvest
i ) in (3.1) and (3.2) with ex-
pectations approximated using the cubic spline interpolation method
proposed in Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kröger (forthcoming).12 We
ﬁnd that the estimated value of b is 0.117 (standard error = 0.065)
and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level against the one-sided alternative that
b > 0. This suggests that the marginal utility of income is greater than
zero. This signiﬁcant relation also suggests that non-incentivized sub-
jective beliefs can be used to successfully predict behavior. We further
ﬁnd that the other-regarding preference parameter q is 0.569 (standard
error = 0.241) and signiﬁcant at the 5% level against a two-sided alter-
native.13 This suggests that social preferences play a signiﬁcant role
in determining investments in the game. Figure 3.3 plots this point
estimate.
We ﬁnd that the point estimate lies within the ﬁrst two identiﬁca-
tions regions. The ﬁrst region was obtained by taking into account all
the possible beliefs that respondents could have. Therefore, the point
estimate will fall by construction within this zone. The point estimate
could fall outside the second identiﬁcation region if the beliefs of play-
ers systematically violated the maintained assumption on beliefs, i.e.,
that senders will not be worse off when investing (E(rinvest
i )  E(r
keep
i ),
used to derive the second identiﬁcation region. In our data, however,
all senders expect to receive from the responder at least as much if
they send their endowment than if they keep it.
12 Cubic spline interpolation allows to approximate expectations with minimal assump-
tions concerning the shape of the underlying distributions. Bellemare, Bissonnette,
and Kröger (forthcoming) show that the bias when approximating a subjective mean
is negligible given the number of probability questions answered by each sender.
13 The standard errors are possibly a little conservative as they do not account for noise
in the approximated expectations.36 Bounding Preference Parameters
Finally, we see that the point estimate using subjective expecta-
tions data lies in close proximity to the dashed line representing the
identiﬁed parameter combinations assuming rational expectations.
Moreover, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between the point esti-
mate and the dashed line.14 Section 3.2.3 revealed that the distribution
of subjective beliefs is centered around the observed response behavior.
This together with the fact that in the simple linear model used here
to illustrate the partial identiﬁcation approach senders’ decisions are
based on the mean of their subjective expectations probably explains
why the dashed line and the point-estimate are close. A model that
relies on the whole belief distribution, as for instance a model in-
cluding risk aversion, would very likely lead to a greater difference
between the inferences that one can draw using subjective vs. rational
expectations.
3.5 conclusion
In this paper we have discussed recent developments in the area
of partial identiﬁcation of econometric models using the stylized
example of a binary investment game. We have shown how bounds
around model parameters can be derived under various levels of
assumptions concerning the beliefs of players. We have also shown
how these bounds can be used to assess the validity of using data on
beliefs collected without providing players incentives to report them
truthfully. Our results provide support for eliciting non-incentivized
subjective expectations data: point estimates using these belies fall
within our most reasonable bounds. More importantly, this paper has
highlighted how the partial identiﬁcation approach can be used to
make inferences in a parametric model under weak assumptions about
the beliefs of players in the investment game.
Another particularly promising area of future research would be
to ask what can be learned about the prevalence of belief dependent
preferences such as reciprocity and guilt aversion without information
on beliefs. Belief-dependent preferences typically involve second-order
beliefs, that is beliefs of players over the distribution of beliefs of other
players. Elicitation of second-order beliefs is complicated by several
factors. First, the task is cognitively more demanding than collecting
data on ﬁrst-order beliefs. Second, consensus effects may lead to a
spurious correlation between decisions and stated second-order beliefs,
14 We estimated by bootstrap the 95% conﬁdence region around our point estimate as
well as a 95% conﬁdence region around the dashed line by bootstrap. In particular,
we generated 1000 bootstrap samples, sampling with replacement the decision and
beliefs of senders. We computed for each bootstrap sample the point estimate as
well as the dashed line. Computing both estimates using the same samples allows
us to control for the correlation between the estimated dashed line and the point
estimates that both rely on the same data. We ﬁnd that both conﬁdence regions
overlap substantially.3.5 conclusion 37
thus biasing the quantitative importance of these preferences (see eg.,
Ellingsen, Johannesson, Torsvik, and Tjøtta (2010), Bellemare, Sebald,
and Strobel (2010)). The tools of partial identiﬁcation may provide a
way to learn about the relevance of these preferences while avoiding
the potential problems posed by elicitation of second-order beliefs.
The application of partial identiﬁcation analysis in experimental
economics goes beyond the partial observability of player beliefs.
For instance, in many common experiments, interval responses are
elicited (as opposed to point-valuations) using multiple price lists, as
discussed by Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2006). Multiple
price lists are frequently used in experiments to measure preference
parameters, willingness to pay, or discount rates. Interval regressions
used to analyze interval responses elicited using multiple price lists
typically impose sufﬁciently strong parametric assumptions on the
distribution of unobservables to point estimate the model parameters
(see eg. Coller and Williams (1999)). The tools of partial identiﬁcation,
on the other hand, allow researchers to bound the model parameters
under minimal assumptions about the location of the true valuations
within the intervals of each respondent. Manski and Tamer (2002) show
how bounds around model parameters can be derived in this setting.
The estimated bounds can thus be contrasted with point estimates
obtained using stronger assumptions, thus providing a basis for model
speciﬁcation testing.
Finally, partial identiﬁcation can also be useful to understand the
preferences of players in games with multiple equilibria. Multiplicity of
equilibria severely complicates point estimation of the heterogeneity in
preferences of players. One way to point identify preferences has been
to assume an equilibrium selection procedure (eg. randomly selecting
one of the possible equilibriums). Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) show
how bounds can be placed around the choice probabilities in discrete
games without imposing any equilibrium selection procedure. As we
have stressed in this paper, these bounds can then be used to perform
meaningful inferences on the model parameters characterizing the
decision rules of players in the game.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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IN WHICH I DISCUSS PREFERENCES AND
EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING PENSIONS
AND SURVIVAL (OR THE LACK THEREOF)4
THE FUTURE OF RETIREMENT AND THE
PENSION SYSTEM: HOW THE PUBLIC’S
EXPECTATIONS VARY OVER TIME AND ACROSS
SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS
The content of this chapter is based on joint work with Arthur van
Soest that previously appeared in the CentER Discussion Paper Series
(2011-065).
4.1 introduction
In models of life cycle behavior and inter-temporal decision making
under uncertainty, expectations play an important role. For example,
consumption, saving, and labour supply decisions of individuals and
households not only depend on their current tastes and opportunities,
but also on their expectations of future prices, their future income, etc.
(see, for example, Feldstein, 1974).
Future expectations often remain unobserved, and traditional macro-
or micro-economic models typically make assumptions on how they
are formed, e.g. assuming rational expectations. The conclusions from
these models may be biased if the assumptions on expectations are not
satisﬁed. To solve the problem that expectations are unobserved, many
recent empirical studies aim at measuring expectations directly using
survey questions. See, for example, Manski (2004) for an assessment of
the validity of this approach. Examples are Keane and Runkle (1990)
on inﬂation expectations, Dominitz and Manski (2005) on expectations
of equity returns, Dominitz and Manski (1997), Das et al. (1999) and
Dominitz (2001) on income expectations, Hurd and McGarry (1995)
on length of life expectations, Stephens (2004) on job loss expectations,
Benítez-Silva and Dwyer (2005) on retirement expectations, Dominitz
and Manski (2006) and Chan and Stevens (2008) on pension expecta-
tions, and Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) on expectations of old
age social security income.
Pension expectations have become particularly relevant since the
aging of the population has led to a debate in many industrialized
countries on the need for pension reforms to keep the pension system
sustainable (see, for example, Lindbeck and Persson, 2003, and Zaidi,
2010). Particularly since the economic and ﬁnancial crisis, high retire-
ment replacement rates can no longer be taken for granted. Govern-
ments are trying to increase awareness of pension risks and individual
responsibility to guarantee ﬁnancial security after retirement.
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In this paper, we analyze expectations of the Dutch population aged
25 and older concerning the future generosity of the two main pillars
of the Dutch system of income provision to the elderly – old age
social security beneﬁts (AOW) and occupational pensions (mandatory
for almost all employees). As in many other European countries,
sustainability of income provision is old age has become an important
issue in public policy discussions due to the aging of the population;
see, e.g., Bovenberg and Gradus (2008). Generous early retirement
beneﬁts are gradually being phased out and replaced by actuarially fair
ﬂexible retirement systems and the idea of working after the normal
retirement age of 65 years has slowly become a real option, although
impediments remain (e.g., Van Solinge and Henkens, 2007). The debate
has been reinforced by the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, leading to
additional pressure on old age social security due to government
budget concerns and to pressure on occupational pensions caused by
the reduced value of the assets of occupational pension funds, who
have invested part of the pension savings of their clients in equity.
This makes it particularly interesting to analyze how different socio-
economic groups forecast the future of the Dutch pension system and
whether and how these forecasts have changed during the recent years
under the inﬂuence of the public discussion and the ﬁnancial and
economic crisis.
The ﬁrst reason why we think studying subjective beliefs is impor-
tant relates to economic modelling. Many studies in the past, some
already reviewed above, disproved the rational expectation hypothesis
as the heterogeneity in beliefs observed in elicited subjective expec-
tations is at odds with the rationality hypothesis. In our sample, at
each given point in time, all the respondents are asked to predict
the same outcome and in principle have access to the same infor-
mation, so that under the assumption of rational expectations, they
should all come to the same conclusion. The large heterogeneity in
reported expectations in our data reveals that they do not. One of the
explanations for this heterogeneity could be that some groups lack
the proper cognitive skills or are not willing to invest time to form
rational beliefs. Analyzing how groups with different socio-economic
characteristics vary in their subjective expectations makes it possible
to test the assumption of rational expectations for the population as
a whole (although it will not be possible to determine who has ratio-
nal expectations and who has not, or which mechanisms drives the
non-rationalities). Moreover, it is of interest to analyze to what extent
reported beliefs are explained by observable respondent characteristics
or contain additional information at the individual level.
Second, misguided expectations may have a negative impact on
future well-being of vulnerable groups in society (see, for example,
Rohwedder and van Soest, 2006). In particular, overly optimistic be-4.2 sample design and survey questions 45
liefs may lead to “under-saving.”1 It is therefore important to see if
different socio-economic groups have realistic views of the future,
and to what extent their misconceptions could impair their future
well-being. This information could be useful for economists concerned
with the mechanisms behind the formation of beliefs and could offer
policy makers new ways of designing effective solutions to improper
saving among the different groups.
Since the summer of 2006, monthly survey data were collected on
the expectations of Dutch households concerning occupational pen-
sions, old age social security, and the average retirement age ten or
twenty years from the time of the interview. The same data (but for a
shorter time period) have been analyzed by Van der Wiel (2008), ana-
lyzing the relation between these expectations and savings decisions
and by Van der Wiel (2009), focusing on the effect of the number of
newspaper articles on the volatility of social security expectations. We
will investigate how social security, occupational pension and average
retirement age expectations have changed over time and how they
vary with socio-economic characteristics. Since we use data collected
up to September 2010, we can also analyze the effect of the recent
crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2,
we describe the sample design and the expectations questions. Sec-
tion 4.3 describes how the answers vary over time and associates
this with the public policy debate in the Netherlands. In Section 4.4,
we analyze some empirical models relating pension expectations to
background characteristics. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 sample design and survey questions
The survey was administered by members of the CentERpanel, an
ongoing Internet panel managed by CentERdata, a data collection
and applied research institute afﬁliated with Tilburg University. The
sample is based upon a simple random sample from the population
in the Netherlands of ages 16 and older and consists of over 2000
households in which one or more adults complete questionnaires at
home every weekend over the Internet. Households without Internet
access are provided with Internet access by CentERdata so that the
survey also covers households without Internet or without a personal
computer. About 75% of all panel members respond to the questions
in a given weekend. Rich background information about the panel
respondents is available from previous interviews.2
1 On the other hand, a recent study by De Grip, Lindeboom and Montizaan (2009)
also suggests that there is a direct effect of expectations on well-being, implying that




Each respondent answers the questions to the speciﬁc survey on
pension expectations once every three months. The total sample of
respondents of ages 25 and older was randomly split into three sub-
samples of about the same size. One subsample gets the questions in
January, April, July and October; the second subsample in February,
May, August and November, etc. This implies that there are observa-
tions for one third of the sample in each month.3 In this study, we
draw on all the data collected between May 2006 and September 2010.
In addition to the questions on future expectations that we will
analyze, the survey asks questions on other pension related issues,
such as the respondents’ satisfaction with several aspects of their
pension provisions and the pension system in general; see De Bresser
and van Soest (2009).
The expectations questions have been asked in the form of subjective
probabilities. According to Manski (2004), this is a much better way
to elicit information on people’s subjective distributions of future out-
comes, providing more information than, for example, simple point
expectations. Subjective probability questions have been extensively
used and validated in US surveys, particularly the Health and Retire-
ment Study, which has subjective probability questions on expected
retirement age, on expected old age social security income, on ex-
pected length of life, on future health problems that limit the ability
to work, and on the probability to leave a bequest (see Juster and
Suzman, 1995; Hurd, 2009).
The ﬁrst questions are about old age social security beneﬁt levels
(AOW: Algemene Ouderdoms Wet). According to the current system,
everyone who has been a resident of the Netherlands from age 15 to
age 65 is fully eligible for these beneﬁts. The amount is determined by
the ofﬁcial minimum subsistence level4 and depends on partnership
status but usually not on earnings or employment history. There is one
exception that may matter for expectations: if one spouse is older than
65 and the other is younger than 65, the couple receives the amount
for singles if the younger spouse has a paid job, but the full amount
for the couple if the younger spouse does not do any paid work; the
additional amount received in the latter case is called the “partner
allowance”. It will be abolished in 2015, and this has already been
announced long before the start of our survey in 2006. Respondents
who are aware of this announced reform may incorporate it in their
expectations concerning future beneﬁt levels. The wording of the ﬁrst
series of questions was:
and
http://www.centerdata.nl/en/TopMenu/Projecten/DNB_household_study/.
3 In May and June 2006 (the ﬁrst two months of the survey) everyone was invited to
participate instead of one third of the sample.
4 The 2010 amounts (including vacation allowance) are C1075 for singles and C1478
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What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now
the purchasing power of AOW beneﬁts will on average be
• Less than now?
• At least 10 percent less than now?
• More than now?
• At least 10 percent more than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means
it will deﬁnitely not happen and 100 means it will certainly
happen.
Half of the sample got the questions with 10 years from now; the
other half with 20 years from now, with randomized assignment.5 All
answers from 0 to 100 were allowed for; consistency restrictions (e.g.,
second answer larger than the ﬁrst one) were not imposed and were
indeed sometimes violated by the respondents. Note that the ﬁrst and
third answer may well add up to less than 100 since people may attach
a positive probability to the event that purchasing power remains the
same. This applies in particular to the purchasing power of AOW
beneﬁts since, in the current system, they are ﬁxed at the minimum
subsistence level and reforms proposed up to now do not change
that (though for couples to whom the “Partner allowance” applies,
the purchasing power of the total beneﬁt will decrease in 2015 – see
above).
The second set of questions concerns the purchasing power of
second pillar pensions. Essentially all employees in the Netherlands
participate in mandatory pension schemes organized at the ﬁrm or
industry level, which in most cases guarantees them a deﬁned beneﬁt
occupational pension that increases with their earnings. There are
differences, however, in, e.g., how the pension level varies with the
pattern of life cycle earnings or whether pension beneﬁts keep track
with inﬂation. The wording of the questions was similar to that for
AOW beneﬁts:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now
the average purchasing power of occupational pensions will be
• Less than now?
• At least 10 percent less than now?
• More than now?
• At least 10 percent more than now?
5 This randomization was independent across waves, so the same person could get the
questions with 10 years in one wave and with 20 years in another wave; in a given
wave, all questions (in all four sets) for a given respondent had 10 years, or they all
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Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means
it will deﬁnitely not happen and 100 means it will certainly
happen.
The answers to these questions may be affected by the problems
faced by occupational pension funds due to the ﬁnancial crisis. Many
pension funds have experienced a reduction of the accumulated pen-
sion wealth of their clients due to falling stock prices, and have an-
nounced that they will not compensate pension amounts for inﬂation
in the near future in response. In the long run, this may lead to much
lower pension levels in real (purchasing power) terms. Implicitly, the
respondents are asked to forecast how much of the inﬂation in the next
ten or twenty years will not be compensated by increases in nominal
pensions – not an easy task.
The third set of questions is about the eligibility age for old age
social security beneﬁts:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now
the age at which people are entitled to AOW beneﬁts will on
average be
• Higher than now?
• At least two years higher than now?
• Lower than now?
• At least two years lower than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means
it will deﬁnitely not happen and 100 means it will certainly
happen.
This question touches the core of the Dutch policy discussion since
2008, which focuses on raising the eligibility age for AOW beneﬁts
from 65 to 66 or 67 for cohorts that will reach age 65 after a certain
date (this date is also part of the discussion).6
The ﬁnal set of questions we will analyze refers to the retirement
age.7 The wording of the questions about the retirement age is:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now
the age at which people stop working will on average be
• Higher than now?
• At least two years higher than now?
6 The plan launched in September 2009 was to implement the changes 10 years from
now, not affecting those who are currently older than 55; this plan was not imple-
mented because the government stepped down, and the debate is still ongoing.
7 We did not feel it was useful to ask about the eligibility age for occupational pensions,
because with increasing ﬂexibility and actuarially fair choices, the formal eligibility
age can be quite low but with unattractively low pension beneﬁts this is not very
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• Lower than now?
• At least two years lower than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means
it will deﬁnitely not happen and 100 means it will certainly
happen.
Although the current policy debate is more about postponing AOW
beneﬁts than about ﬁxing the retirement age, the common view is that
later entitlement to AOW beneﬁts will also lead to later retirement.
4.3 time trends and age patterns in pension expectations
During the time period covered by our data, there have been several
lively policy debates on public and private pension reforms. Long
before the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, policy makers already saw
the need to reform the public pension system due to the aging of
the population (see, for example, Bovenberg and Gradus, 2008). The
rising government budget deﬁcit during the crisis starting in 2008 has
strengthened the need for reforms of state pensions, but, partly due
to the resignation of the government in early 2010 and the long time
it took to form a new government, ﬁnal decisions have still not been
made. Occupational pension funds, confronted with negative returns
on their investments in the stock market, have emphasized the need
to reduce the generosity of pension beneﬁts, involving lower beneﬁts
or later retirement, to avoid pension premiums continuing to rise. In
this section, we investigate how the general public’s expectations of
the generosity of the pension system have changed during the time
period 2006 - 2010 and to what extent they have responded to the
policy discussion.
Figure 4.1 shows how the average answers to the probability ques-
tions on the purchasing power of AOW beneﬁts have developed over
the time period covered by the survey (May 2006 - September 2010).8
Before discussing the time patterns, some other ﬁndings are worth
noting. First, the average probabilities are consistent, in the sense that
the ﬁrst probability (“less than now”) always exceeds the second one
(“at least 10% less than now”), the third probability (“more than now”)
always exceeds the fourth one (“at least 10% more”), and the sum of
the ﬁrst and third probability is always much less than 100%, implying
that, on average, a substantial positive probability of about 30% is
attached to the event that the purchasing power of AOW beneﬁts will
not change. This is in line with the notion that receiving AOW beneﬁts
8 The ﬁgures are weighted with sample weights to correct for unit non-response related
to gender, age, and education. We do not address the issue of possible focal answers
(see, e.g., Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin, 1999), since heaping at 0, 50 or 100 does
not seem such a large problem in these data, with the percentage of 50-50 answers
varying between 12 and 17 percent.50 Retirement expectations
Figure 4.1: The probability of changes in the purchasing power of the AOW
beneﬁts 10 or 20 years from now
should only put household income on the ofﬁcial poverty line, giving
a ﬁxed purchasing power level over time.
Second, the ﬁgures are asymmetric, revealing a general sense of
“pessimism”: the average probability that purchasing power will fall
is much larger than the probability that it will rise; and the average
probability that purchasing power will fall by at least 10% is much
larger than the probability that it will rise by at least 10%. This may
seem surprising since there are no plans to change the purchasing
power of these beneﬁts, which, as explained above, are in principle
determined by the ofﬁcial poverty line. On the other hand, it might
reﬂect that some respondents are aware of the future removal of the
“Partner allowance”, which, although it applies to a limited subgroup
of the elderly only, will reduce the average beneﬁt per person or per
household.
Third, there seem to be no systematic differences between the “10
years from now” and the “20 years from now” probabilities, although
there are some non-negligible differences in speciﬁc months. Perhaps
most respondents see 10 or 20 years simply as in the long run and do
not make any distinction.
Hardly any time trend is found in the probabilities of an increase,
an increase by 10% or more, or a fall by 10% or more. The lack of
time trend may reﬂect the fact that the current policy debate does not
concern the level of AOW beneﬁts (the decision to remove the “Partner
allowance” was already made in 1995). The only time trend we ﬁnd is
for the probability that beneﬁts will fall in real terms, although even
here, the pattern is not completely consistent and somewhat different4.3 time trends and age patterns in pension expectations 51
Figure 4.2: The probability of changes in the purchasing power of occupa-
tional pensions 10 or 20 years from now
for the 10 and 20 years groups. Still, we can conclude that pessimism
has increased since the beginning of 2008 and particularly during the
last 12 months of the survey.
Figure 4.2 shows the average answers to the probability questions
on occupational pension levels, separately for the groups who got
the “10 years from now” and the “20 years from now” questions.
We ﬁnd the same asymmetry revealing a general sense of pessimism.
This is less surprising than for the state beneﬁts, since the debate
on sustainability of pensions due to the aging of the population was
already quite active in 2006. Still, in principle occupational pensions
are fully funded and workers save for their own occupational pension,
so that population aging should not directly affect the purchasing
power of these pensions if pension premiums and returns to the assets
in which they are invested remain at the same level. As before, there
are no systematic differences between the 10 and 20 years groups.
The trend towards larger pessimism is considerably stronger here
than in the expectations concerning AOW beneﬁts. Subjective probabil-
ities that occupational pensions will fall in real terms have clearly risen
since early 2008. This suggests that respondents have anticipated the
problems that pension funds were going to face due to the ﬁnancial
crisis. Not much has changed in 2009, when it became clear that many
pensions were no longer fully funded. The probabilities that occupa-
tional pensions will fall by at least 10% have risen as well, though by
much less. Accordingly, the probabilities that the purchasing power of
occupational pensions will increase or will increase by 10% or more
have fallen, particularly since 2009.52 Retirement expectations
Figure 4.3: The probability of changes in eligibility age for the AOW 10 or 20
years from now
Figure 4.3 shows how expectations concerning the eligibility age for
state beneﬁts change over time. Here the asymmetry is even larger
than for the pension and AOW beneﬁt levels. The average reported
probability that the eligibility age will fall (or will fall by at least 2
years) is quite small and might be upward biased by reporting errors of
respondents who did not understand the questions or did not answer
them seriously. The average reported probability that the eligibility
age will increase over the next ten years was already about 60% in
May 2006, rose to about 70% in the Summer of 2009 and to about 75%
in Summer 2010. A similar clear trend towards more pessimism can
be observed for the “20 years from now” group. The trend is quite
plausible and in line with the announced reforms.
The ﬁgures also reveal that respondents were relatively pessimistic
in the ﬁrst few months of the survey (May and June 2006), probably
due to the fact that the Social Democrats announced their intention
to reduce the eligibility or generosity of AOW beneﬁts to cope with
the increasing costs due to population aging. In the months after that,
these plans were weakened and other parties expressed disagreement,
which is probably why respondents became less pessimistic over the
summer of 2006. Respondents’ optimism rose until the general elec-
tions in November 2006. Shortly after that, several groups revitalized
the discussion on increasing the AOW eligibility age and labor force
participation of older workers, and pessimism increased. Particularly
since late 2008, inﬂuenced by the budget problems caused by the crisis,
government plans to change the AOW eligibility age took concrete
form, and increasing pessimism seems perfectly justiﬁed.4.3 time trends and age patterns in pension expectations 53
Figure 4.4: The probability of changes in the average age at which people
will stop working 10 or 20 years from now
Figure 4.4 shows the development over time of expectations concern-
ing the average age at which people will stop working 10 or 20 years
from now. The asymmetry is similar to that for the AOW eligibility
age. The average reported probability that the retirement age will
increase over the next ten years rises from about 60% to more than
70% between 2006 and 2010. The trend is similar but somewhat less
salient for the “20 years from now” group. The probability that in the
next ten or twenty years the retirement age will rise by two or more
years increases less, from about 50% to about 55%.
The patterns in 2006 are similar to those in Figure 4.3. People are
pessimistic at ﬁrst (Summer 2006) but pessimism falls until the gen-
eral elections in November. In the ﬁrst few months of 2007, the new
government launched a plan to stimulate labor force participation of
older workers by making AOW beneﬁts dependent on participation
in the years before the normal retirement age. In response to this, the
number of respondents expecting an increase in the average retirement
age rose. The effect disappeared when the government plans appeared
to be unfeasible. In Spring 2008 the expected average retirement age
rose again, possibly because some respondents already feared that the
ﬁnancial crisis would affect the accumulated pension wealth invested
by pension funds. Respondents’ expectations then remained approxi-
mately constant until the summer of 2009, but pessimism increased
during the last period (Fall 2009 - Fall 2010).
The probability questions ask about general events and if everyone
would have the same information set and the same way of forming
their subjective distributions (like rational expectations), there should54 Retirement expectations
be no systematic association with respondent characteristics. We will
analyze this for a large set of individual characteristics in multivariate
regressions in the next section. Here we present the relation between
the probabilities concerning changing the eligibility age for state ben-
eﬁts (see Figure 4.3) with gender (Figure 4.5) and age (Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.5 shows the time pattern for men and women separately. The
trend is almost identical for men and women. In most time periods, the
two curves on the probabilities of postponing eligibility suggest that
men are somewhat less pessimistic than women, but the differences
are small.
Figure 4.6 shows how the subjective probabilities vary with re-
spondent age, combining data from all available time periods.9 These
ﬁgures show that pessimism concerning the state pension eligibility
age falls with age. For example, the average percentage probability
that the state pension eligibility age will be increased is about 60%
for respondents of 30 years old, but only about 40% for respondents
aged 70. The average probability that the same eligibility age will rise
by at least two years is about 40% for the youngest group and only
25% for the oldest age group. A surprisingly similar age pattern is
found for the other questions (results available upon request from the
authors) and the age patterns seem even stronger than the time trends
discussed above. Interpreting the age patterns in terms of general
optimism or pessimism, these results suggest the opposite of those of
Dominitz and Manski (2005), who ﬁnd that young people have more
optimistic expectations on equity returns than older people.
4.4 empirical models of beliefs
In this section, we will assess the impact of respondents’ demographic
characteristics on their reported retirement expectations. We are inter-
ested in knowing if some groups in society are particularity pessimistic
or display unwarranted optimism toward retirement. As emphasized
in Section 1, there are several reasons why we think this is impor-
tant: to test the rational expectations hypothesis and to determine the
usefulness of collecting this type of information at the micro level in
future surveys, and to analyze the potential negative impact of mis-
guided perceptions of the future on well-being for vulnerable groups
in society, in particular through “under-saving.”
4.4.1 Model speciﬁcation
Following the concerns expressed above and the descriptive results
in the previous section, we focus our attention on the questions con-
cerning negative outcomes. Given the current situation of pensions,
9 Estimations obtained using local linear regression with Gaussian kernel and a
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Figure 4.5: Expectations concerning the eligibility age for AOW beneﬁts 10
or 20 years from now for men and women
Figure 4.6: Expectations concerning the eligibility age for AOW beneﬁts 10
or 20 years from now as a function of respondent age56 Retirement expectations
changes to the actual policy that would curb the cost of the systems
are more relevant than changes that would exacerbate them. We model
eight dependent variables: the answers to the questions concerning
a general decrease or a decrease of more than 10% in the generosity
of the old age social security beneﬁts (AOW) and of occupational
pensions, and the answers to questions concerning a general increase
or an increase of at least two years in the age of eligibility to AOW
beneﬁts and of the average retirement age in the Netherlands.
All dependent variables are subjective probabilities and take values
between 0 %-points and 100 %-points, and a substantial number of
respondents used these extreme values as answers: the percentage of
zeros varies from 2.2% to 11.9%, and the fraction of 100% answers
varies from 4.6% to 22.5%. We take into account the censored nature
of the variables in our estimations by estimating two-limit Tobit speci-
ﬁcations. Eight separate models are used for each of the probability
questions concerning the more pessimistic outcomes (levels of state
and occupational pensions lower or at least 10% lower; eligibility age
for state pensions and average retirement age delayed or delayed by
at least two years); the probabilities of the optimistic outcomes are
always rather low and will not be analyzed further.
Over time, all respondents were asked to answer the questions up
to 15 times, allowing us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at
the respondent level, using panel data techniques. We therefore use
random-effects Tobit models10 with censoring both on the left at 0,
and on the right at 100:11
P
it = x0


















it is a latent variable, determined by a vector of explanatory
variables xit, an unobserved individual effect ai and an idiosyncratic
error term eit. The observed probability Pit is obtained from P
it through
censoring at both ends, implying positive probabilities of reporting
0 and 100. The individual effects and error terms are assumed to
follow normal distributions independent of the xit , as in the standard
random effects Tobit model. The model parameters (b, sa and se) are
estimated jointly using maximum likelihood. Estimates are obtained
using Stata.
10 Since many socioeconomic characteristics (education, gender) hardly vary over time
we did not pursue using ﬁxed effects models.
11 In some households, both spouses answered the questions. We do not account for the
potential correlation between error terms of individual effects of respondents in the
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The same independent variables xit were included in all eight mod-
els. First, we include a set of basic demographic and socio-economic
respondent and household characteristics: a dummy variable with
value 1 if the respondent is a male, age of the respondent, age-squared,
a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent lives with a
partner. We control for education using dummies for intermediate
education (secondary general or intermediate vocational) and high
education (higher vocational or university), using low education (pri-
mary school only or lower vocational schooling) as the reference class.
To capture employment status, we include dummy variables with
value 1 if the respondent is retired, disabled (or partially disabled),
unemployed, homemaker, and working in the public sector; the bench-
mark group are those who work in the private sector. We included
time dummies for each month (except one) in order to control for
macro-economic shocks on beliefs, like the ﬁnancial and economic
crisis. We also included a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if
the question concerned a 10-year horizon and value 1 if the question
concerned a 20-year horizon.
We controlled for respondents’ income by including their log-income
as an explanatory variable. Respondents who reported an income
larger than C8000 per month were considered as outliers and removed
from the sample. We also included in the model respondents who
explicitly refused to answer the income questions or who reported a
value of 0, a value often attributed to a refusal to answer. For these
respondents, the value of the log-income was set to 0 and two dummy
variables were included in the model: one for those who declared an
income of 0 and one for unknown or undisclosed incomes.
In Table 4.1, we present the mean values of the explanatory variables
in the ﬁrst month (when everyone of age 25 and older was asked to
participate in the survey) and in the last three months (when one third
participated each month, so that the last three months cover the com-
plete sample). The table shows that the means of most of the variables
are quite stable over time. We also see that very few respondents did
not report an income (none in the ﬁrst month, 10 in the last three
months). Not all respondents always answered the questions, due to
refreshment, attrition, or temporary non-participation (e.g., holidays).
About 1,300 respondents answered in the ﬁrst month and in the last
three months, but in total, 2,780 respondents took part in the survey
over time. Average age is relatively high, because all respondents of
age 25 and older are asked to answer the questions (with no upper
age limit). Median net personal income (zeros excluded) rises from
C1,200 in the ﬁrst month to about C1,515 at the end of the survey
period; there is no correction for inﬂation. The average education level
also increases over time (low education is the reference category).
The fraction of homemakers is falling over time, while the number
of public sector employees is rising. A large fraction of all workers58 Retirement expectations







Log. net-inc. (if inc. > 0) 7.165 7.323
Inc. = 0 0.108 0.102
Unk. Inc. 0.024 0.007
Educ. Med. 0.389 0.410






Public sector 0.212 0.245
In 20 years 0.512 0.482
N 1,309 1,121
Note: Means use respondents included in at least one of the regressions;
means are weighted with sample weights based upon age, gender and education.
(almost 40%) are in the public sector, which is deﬁned in a broad sense,
including, for example, the (semi-public) health and education sectors.
The dummy “In 20 years” has value 1 if the questions referred to 20
years from now and 0 otherwise; the time period in the questions was
randomly drawn, independent of all other variables and with equal
probabilities for “10 years” and “20 years” so that by design its ex ante
mean should be equal to 0.5. The ex post mean is somewhat different,
mainly due to non-response.
4.4.2 Estimation results
The estimation results are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Since we
estimated the equations separately, we do not consider the correlations
between the error terms or between the unobserved heterogeneity
terms of the different equations. We consider a 5%-signiﬁcance level4.4 empirical models of beliefs 59
in discussing which variables are signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant. Note
that the models all explain the subjective probability of a negative
outcome, so a positive sign in the estimates indicates an increase in
pessimism if the independent variable increases.12
The results vary across the eight probabilities, but we observe some
common patterns. First, males express signiﬁcantly lower probabilities
when it comes to the four worst-case scenarios, indicating that men
are less pessimistic than women, in line with ﬁndings in the ﬁnance
literature (Barber and Odean, 2001). For example, the estimated proba-
bility that the state beneﬁt eligibility age will rise by at least two years
is more than four percentage points higher for men than for women,
keeping other characteristics constant. This is a much larger difference
than the gender difference in Figure 5, where other characteristics
were not controlled for.
Second, respondents with a partner are signiﬁcantly more pes-
simistic in their four answers concerning age of eligibility to AOW
and retirement age. A possible explanation is that couples are more
concerned about retirement issues than singles and therefore pay more
attention to the public debate. Another possible explanation could be
that respondents with partners are often secondary earners working
part-time, for whom income is not a good proxy to ﬁnancial literacy
or interest in ﬁnancial matters (see below).
In general, high income individuals more often believe that 10 or
20 years from now, workers will retire later and the AOW eligibility
age will rise. This view corresponds with the opinion of “ﬁnancially
literate” individuals. The dummies with value 1 if reported income is
0 or if no income is reported are signiﬁcant for the four questions con-
cerning eligibility and retirement ages. In these cases, the ln(income)
variable is set to zero. Taking this into account implies that non- and
zero-reporters are not very different from those with an average log
income.13
Similarly, we ﬁnd that people with medium and high education
report a signiﬁcantly higher probability for all the four more generic
pessimistic questions. The effect is not signiﬁcant for the four questions
concerning a decrease of "at least 10%" or "more than two years". This
ﬁnding is in line with the notion that pessimism is justiﬁed and the
higher educated respondents tend to be better informed.
Many of the dummies on employment status were signiﬁcant. Un-
employed individuals appear to be signiﬁcantly more pessimistic than
private sector workers (the omitted category), giving signiﬁcantly
12 The estimates of the slope coefﬁcients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects on the
expected subjective probabilities, due to the non-linearity of the model. The marginal
effect of a covariate is equal to the estimated parameter times the probability of being
uncensored; for the average respondent, this probability varies from 0.747 to 0.865
over the eight questions.
13 The average log income is about 7.25, so we should compare the coefﬁcients on the
dummies with 7.25 times the coefﬁcient on log income.60 Retirement expectations
Table 4.2: Estimation Results Two-Limit Tobit Models with Random Effects:
Probabilities of Negative Changes in Future Generosity of State
and Occupational Pensions
Generosity of AOW Generosity of occ. pension
Less... At least 10% less... Less... At least 10% less...
Male -0.864 -4.711*** -1.977 -4.596***
(-0.679) (-4.210) (-1.597) (-4.219)
Partner 2.777** 2.808*** 1.849* 1.547
(2.407) (2.731) (1.649) (1.550)
Age 0.782*** 0.507** 0.226 -0.009
(3.166) (2.317) (0.940) (-0.042)
Age-sqr./100 -1.198*** -0.719*** -0.673*** -0.262
(-5.034) (-3.405) (-2.907) (-1.279)
Log. net-inc. 0.819 -0.031 -0.451 -1.092
(1.067) (-0.044) (-0.604) (-1.627)
Inc. = 0 4.785 -0.610 -3.668 -6.865
(0.919) (-0.128) (-0.724) (-1.504)
Unk. Inc. 4.808 4.959 -1.683 -0.342
(0.773) (0.876) (-0.279) (-0.063)
Educ. Med. 6.369*** 2.386** 3.657*** 0.395
(4.662) (1.986) (2.755) (0.338)
Educ. High 11.140*** 3.948*** 6.512*** 0.434
(7.990) (3.223) (4.807) (0.364)
Self-employed -1.181 1.788 -2.901 -0.574
(-0.568) (0.963) (-1.441) (-0.319)
Retired 1.893 -0.270 -0.334 -1.130
(1.232) (-0.194) (-0.223) (-0.841)
Disabled -2.442 -0.593 -2.812 -0.660
(-1.162) (-0.314) (-1.372) (-0.360)
Homemaker -2.099 -3.265** -3.451** -4.846***
(-1.168) (-2.022) (-1.976) (-3.104)
Unemployed 2.292 4.630** 1.548 5.870***
(1.000) (2.230) (0.701) (2.957)
Public sector 1.891 0.880 2.026* 1.543
(1.613) (0.842) (1.783) (1.526)
In 20 years 0.278 3.031*** -0.311 1.936***
(0.705) (8.273) (-0.813) (5.517)
Constant 36.062*** 37.890*** 55.771*** 52.991***
(4.451) (5.223) (7.072) (7.538)
Num. Ind. 3,030 3,027 3,033 3,032
Num. Obs. 25,899 25,746 26,017 25,990
r 0.450 0.407 0.450 0.418
sa 26.444 22.751 25.785 22.330
se 29.261 27.450 28.503 26.323
Dummies for each but the initial time period were included, but are not reported.
t-values in parentheses
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Table 4.3: Estimation Results Two-Limit Tobit Models with Random Effects:
Probabilities of Delays in Eligibility to AOW Beneﬁts and Average
Retirement Age.
Eligibility to AOW General ret. age
Later... At least 2 yrs later... Later... At least 2 yrs later...
Male -0.384 -5.374*** -0.644 -5.456***
(-0.318) (-4.500) (-0.578) (-5.045)
Partner 4.698*** 3.610*** 3.885*** 3.073***
(4.335) (3.338) (3.900) (3.140)
Age -0.588** -0.690*** 0.125 -0.029
(-2.514) (-2.973) (0.583) (-0.139)
Age-sqr./100 0.261 0.559** -0.312 -0.029
(1.159) (2.497) (-1.509) (-0.143)
Log. net-inc. 2.547*** 1.711** 2.069*** 2.144***
(3.506) (2.343) (3.142) (3.272)
Inc. = 0 14.909*** 11.876** 14.096*** 14.721***
(3.032) (2.396) (3.162) (3.308)
Unk. Inc. 19.096*** 14.266** 13.601** 18.028***
(3.268) (2.423) (2.567) (3.411)
Educ. Med. 2.638** 0.134 3.392*** 0.770
(2.040) (0.104) (2.846) (0.664)
Educ. High 4.664*** -0.862 4.845*** -1.793
(3.529) (-0.659) (3.977) (-1.516)
Self-employed -1.468 1.890 -0.946 1.624
(-0.754) (0.967) (-0.531) (0.920)
Retired 4.170*** 1.866 1.016 0.808
(2.870) (1.286) (0.773) (0.619)
Disabled -2.752 0.254 -3.671** -0.179
(-1.398) (0.128) (-2.037) (-0.100)
Homemaker -0.649 -2.531 -3.129** -2.820*
(-0.384) (-1.493) (-2.035) (-1.848)
Unemployed 5.905*** 6.846*** 4.822** 5.913***
(2.793) (3.189) (2.529) (3.081)
Public sector 0.200 0.979 0.240 0.991
(0.182) (0.893) (0.240) (1.003)
In 20 years 4.626*** 8.305*** 2.775*** 5.790***
(12.664) (22.313) (8.445) (17.401)
Constant 63.013*** 59.007*** 48.700*** 39.641***
(8.208) (7.705) (6.945) (5.744)
Num. Ind. 3,033 3,032 3,035 3,035
Num Obs. 26,037 26,004 26,044 26,031
r 0.472 0.442 0.484 0.446
sa 25.208 24.738 23.542 22.532
se 26.667 27.812 24.325 25.110
Dummies for each but the initial time period were included, but are not reported.
t-values in parentheses
Stars denote signiﬁcance: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level62 Retirement expectations
lower answers to all “worst-case” scenarios (at least 10% less, at least
2 years later) and to the questions concerning a later eligibility age for
state pensions and a later average age of retirement. The coefﬁcient
on the homemaker dummy is always negative and often signiﬁcant,
suggesting that homemakers are less pessimistic than employees in the
private sector. Retired and disabled respondents are not very different
from private sector workers (everything else held constant), though
retired individuals seem to believe more often that the eligibility to
AOW beneﬁts will be delayed while those receiving disability beneﬁts
less often think that the retirement age will rise. Public sector workers
are more pessimistic than private sector workers but the differences
are only marginally signiﬁcant.
Age generally has a signiﬁcant effect and the marginal effect of
age is usually negative for most of the sample. The maximum of the
quadratic function of age is reached between 15 and 30 years old
in the series where at least one of the age parameters is signiﬁcant.
Note that our sample includes respondents aged 25 or older, and
the large majority of the respondents are older than 30. Therefore,
we can say that in general, keeping other characteristics constant,
younger individuals are more pessimistic concerning the pension
system than older people. This is in line with the conclusion about
the age patterns in the previous section (see Figure 6), where other
characteristics were not kept constant. This ﬁnding is not explained
by either the knowledge or the general optimism arguments that we
used above. Perhaps it relates to the fact that, in spite of the fact that
the question explicitly mentions “10 years from now” or “20 years
from now” respondents often answer the questions thinking about
their own pension provision at the time when they retire, which will
probably be less generous for younger people than for those who are
already approaching retirement.
Finally, there is a signiﬁcant positive effect of asking questions
concerning a 20-year horizon rather than a 10-year horizon, indicating
that respondents are more pessimistic concerning pension provisions
20 years from now than concerning pensions 10 years from now. This
could be expected from the ﬁgures in the previous section and is in
line with the fact that the effect of population aging on, for example,
the ratio between the 65+ and 65- population sizes, is expected to
increase further during the next twenty years.14
The estimates of the standard deviations at the bottom of the ta-
ble (sa for the individual effects; se for the error terms) indicate that
there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity: between 40 and 50 per-
cent of the total unexplained variation in the reported probabilities




e). This also answers the second question we raised
at the beginning of this section: the covariates used in our model do
14 See, for example, van Duin and Garssen (2011).4.5 conclusion 63
not capture the heterogeneity in beliefs completely, and the reported
probabilities provide additional information, (not just noise – which
might be the case if sa were negligible compared to se). This is in line
with the existing literature emphasizing the value of subjective prob-
abilities in survey data (see, e.g., Manski 2004), reinforcing the idea
that eliciting information of expectations is important for researchers
interested in questions related to retirement and pensions.
4.5 conclusion
We have analyzed expectations of the Dutch population of ages 25 and
older concerning the system of income provision after retirement. The
recent trends and policy discussions that seem to justify the expecta-
tion that future pensions will be less generous in terms of pension
levels, eligibility ages, or both, are reﬂected in the trend in expecta-
tions, but only to a limited extent. Expectations seem to adjust only
very slowly to the new reality and in this case this probably implies
that the Dutch population is probably too optimistic, on average. Our
micro-data also revealed substantial heterogeneity across and within
socio-economic groups, suggesting that the average optimism is due
to the over-optimism of a substantial subsample, whereas others may
well have rational expectations.
The ﬁnding that men are less pessimistic than women is consis-
tent with ﬁndings in existing studies in a different context. The fact
that richer (and higher educated) individuals are signiﬁcantly more
pessimistic concerning some aspects of retirement than poorer respon-
dents is in line with a positive association between socio-economic
status and knowledge of the public debate on pension provisions.
The ﬁnding that younger individuals are more pessimistic than older
respondents may relate to the fact that respondents often answer the
questions thinking about their own pension provision at the time
when they retire (in spite of the wording of the questions).
From an economic policy point of view, the results we have obtained
in models that relate expectations to socio-economic characteristics
contain both good and bad news, under the assumption that pes-
simism is justiﬁed and the more pessimistic respondents are also the
most realistic. That younger individuals are aware of the possible neg-
ative changes in pensions is certainly comforting news, as long as they
will adapt their saving behavior accordingly. The younger individuals,
who are likely to witness changes to the pension system, have time
and room to adapt their employment career and their life-cycle saving
plans to this new reality, and can minimize an unwanted decline of
well-being at retirement.
On the other hand, we view the fact that poorer individuals tend to
be more optimistic as bad news. The poorer individuals depend more
on the old age social security beneﬁts than their richer counterparts,64 Retirement expectations
and are therefore more affected by a reduction in the generosity of
these beneﬁts. For the poorest among them, it might not make a
lot of difference to anticipate the changes, as they are not able to
save for retirement and their income will probably consist almost
solely of social security anyhow. However, not anticipating the policy
changes could have a larger negative impact on the well-being of the
middle class, who are likely to save too little under erroneous beliefs
concerning the future. An unrealistic view of the future of public
pensions could have important welfare effects for these respondents.
Future research opportunities remain. Adding more waves of data
will help to better identify the long term consequences of the ﬁnancial
and economic crisis. In addition, some methodological improvements
are possible. First, we already mentioned that the full information on
individual behaviour provided by the multidimensional panel struc-
ture is not fully exploited. We could control for general pessimism
by estimating the equations jointly, and by allowing the terms of in-
dividual heterogeneity to be correlated among individuals. Another
interesting step would be to jointly analyze the beliefs of respondents
within a household, and to assess if unwarranted optimism or pes-
simism is contagious among partners. Finally, since respondents tend
to answer our probability questions using focal answers such as “50
percent,” the assumptions needed for the Tobit model may not be jus-
tiﬁed, and a model that explicitly accounts for the 50-50’s, other focal
answers, and the rounding to multiples of 5 or 10 seems worthwhile
to check the robustness of our results.
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INDIVIDUAL SURVIVAL CURVES COMBINING
SUBJECTIVE AND ACTUAL MORTALITY RISKS
This chapter is based on my joint work with Michael Hurd and Pierre-
Carl Michaud.
5.1 introduction
Mortality expectations play a key role in economic models of savings
(Hurd, 1989), retirement (French, 2005) and insurance (Yaari, 1965).
Most of the empirical work in these ﬁelds has used the convenient
rational expectations (RE) assumption replacing individual expecta-
tions with actual life-tables aggregated to allow only for differences
in gender and sometimes race. Of course, there is no particular rea-
son why this assumption should hold, in aggregate and/or at the
micro level. Some suggestive aggregate evidence against the RE has
been presented by Hurd and McGarry (1993) using subjective survival
probability questions from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). In
this paper, Hurd and McGarry showed that men were slightly more
optimistic than the life-table and women slightly more pessimistic
than the life-table. Using a more formal model estimating individual
subjective survival curves, Gan, Hurd and McFadden (2005) showed
that on average, respondents from the AHEAD cohort of HRS were
optimistic relative to the life-table.
At face value, these results raise doubts about the validity of the RE
assumption used in economic models involving mortality expectations
when these are replaced by life-table probabilities. At the micro level,
both these papers revealed a tremendous amount of heterogeneity in
subjective survival probabilities. The answers co-vary with known risk
factors (e.g. smoking, health problems) in the expected way. In a follow-
up study using the panel dimension of the data, Hurd and McGarry
(2002) showed that this heterogeneity helped predict future mortality,
over and above known risk factors. It is important to point out that
although using aggregate expectations is likely to be misleading at
the micro level, this evidence does not necessarily imply a violation of
the RE hypothesis: the heterogeneity helps predict mortality and thus
individuals may have private information about their mortality risk.
There are two main reasons why life-tables may not be the right
benchmark to test the RE assumption. Because there is heterogeneity in
mortality risk in the population, the future age-speciﬁc mortality risk
of someone alive today is unlikely to match the mortality rates of older
individuals alive at the same point in time. Unless one adopts a model
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of period and cohort effects (e.g. Lee, 1992), using current period life
tables to forecast future mortality rates will miss the very persistent
but complicated march of age-speciﬁc mortality rates resulting in
the observed two-digit increase in life expectancy witnessed over the
last 75 years. Second, even without cohort or period effects present,
aggregate life-table probabilities will exhibit a ﬂatter age proﬁle when
there is uncontrolled unobserved heterogeneity (Vaupel, 1979). This is
due to spurious negative duration dependence or dynamic selection
with the ﬁttest surviving the longest.
In this paper, we use an actual mortality model estimated from
16 years of longitudinal data for the same respondents answering
expectation questions. We show how to parametrize the model to test
the rational expectations hypothesis at the aggregate level but also for
sub-groups of the population. The framework is ﬂexible enough to
allow for a large amount of heterogeneity and allows us to recover
individual subjective survival curves which incorporate the private
information held by respondents about their survival. In particular, we
account for the possibility that individuals provided rounded answers
which we are able to ﬁlter when making predictions for individual
survival curves. We discuss how, in future work, these estimates could
be used in a number of applications related to consumption & savings
and population projection.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we describe the
data and discuss the probability questions used to elicit subjective sur-
vival probabilities. In Section 5.3, we present the models of subjective
survival. In Section 5.4, we present the estimation results. Section 5.5
concludes.
5.2 data
The data used in this paper mainly come from the Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS).1 We use nine waves of this biennial survey, from
1992 to 2008. The sample includes respondents aged 50 and older, and
their spouses. Death is recorded in exit interviews and conﬁrmed with
matches to the National Death Index (NDI). Respondents for whom
the vital status is unknown are also matched to the NDI based on
key characteristics such as their name, etc. Since we use covariates
measured in the previous wave to predict mortality at the interview,
we consider respondents from waves 1 to 8 of the survey, ranging from
1992 to 2006.
1 Note that the HRS was merged with the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the
Oldest Old (AHEAD), the survey used by Gan, Hurd, and McFadden (2005), in 1998.
The ﬁrst waves of AHEAD were collected in 1993 and 1995. As the name implies,
AHEAD surveyed only respondents aged 70 and more, although their spouses, also
included in the data, were sometimes younger than 70. As a result, the sample we use
here also includes respondents that are younger than those included in the reference
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Figure 5.1 shows the comparison between period life-table and
one-year mortality in three waves of the HRS. For this, we used all
respondents answering in that wave and used the year of death from
the HRS/NDI information to compute the fraction who are known
to have survived one year. These data from the HRS are weighted
using respondent-level weights for each of these three years. The
period life tables are obtained from the Human Mortality Database
(www.mortality.org).
For all years shown, there is a close correspondence between HRS
survival and period life tables prior to age 75. However, HRS survival
is somewhat higher at older ages in 1994 and to some extent in 2000.
By 2006, the difference has vanished. This difference is likely to be
due to the sampling frame the HRS used. For each cohort entering the
HRS study, the non-institutionalized population is sampled. The non-
institutionalized population has more favorable survival prospects,
thus explaining the difference with period life-tables which record
all deaths. The gap vanishes as the study progresses because HRS
follows respondents who enter nursing homes. Most of those aged 75+
in 1994 comes from the 1993 AHEAD study of non-institutionalized
respondents born prior to 1923, whereas those aged 75+ in 2006 comes
from a mix of cohorts entering in 1992 and 1998 and are thus more
representative of that population by the time they are observed in 2006
since HRS follows them into nursing homes.
This sampling difference shows how crucial it is to use the actual
mortality experience of those answering the expectations questions.
Figure 5.1 suggests using national mortality would lead us to underes-
timate the survival probability of the respondents in the HRS. Even
under the assumption that these respondents have rational expecta-
tions and can report them perfectly, a comparison of their beliefs and
of national mortality data would suggest erroneously that they are
optimistic. In turn, this could lead to economic behavior that would
appear as suboptimal or ill-advised, but that would simply be coherent
with the mortality risk they really face. Given that one of the aims of
the paper is to test the RE assumption, using the right benchmark is
clearly important. We do not want to interpret a potentially rational
deviation from nationally representative mortality as a deviation from
actual mortality risk.
In order to characterize subjective survival expectations and in turn
derive a test of the RE assumption, we need information on subjective
survival expectations. We obtain this information from the answer to
the following question:
[Using any] number from 0 to 100 where “0” means that
you think there is absolutely no chance and “100” means
that you think the event is absolutely sure to happen...
What do you think are chances that: You will live to at least
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Age of respondent
Observations from the HRS weighted with HRS sampling weights
Proportion surviving an additional year
Figure 5.1: Comparison of the survival rate over one year at various ages
between the HRS respondents in 1994, 2000, and 2006 with the
period life-table for these years.5.3 objective, subjective, and self-reported probabilities 71
where A is a target age that varies for each respondent. The youngest
respondents were asked to report a probability of survival to age
75. Respondents older than 65 were usually asked about survival to
another target age. This target age was generally determined as an age
11 to 15 years in the future that is also a multiple of 5.2 Our analysis
includes 18,791 respondents who answered the relevant probability
questions, were observed at least twice in time (ﬁrst alive), and pro-
vided information on the covariates included in the analysis. When
using the full sample, the number of observations (i.e. respondent-
wave) is 80,298.3
The use of self-reported probabilities in an empirical analysis may
be problematic, mostly due to rounding or measurement error. To see
this, consider two series of histograms showing the distribution of the
elicited subjective probabilities for the 6 target ages that were used, all
waves of the HRS confounded. Figures 5.2 (a) and (b) present these
histograms for females and males respectively.
At ﬁrst glance, we see that there is substantial heterogeneity in the
reported probabilities, with signiﬁcant heaping at the multiples of
50%-points. We can also see that the proportion of answers of that
type is rather stable for each target age. Answers of 0% and 100%
are particularly problematic in the analysis of survival, given that
these answers are not compatible with a model of proportional hazard,
often used in duration analysis. Hence, taken at face value, answers of
0% and 100% do not allow us to obtain survival curves. We also ﬁnd
evidence of rounding at multiples of 25, 10, and 5, and even ﬁnd some
very precise answers reported with a 1%-precision. The shapes of the
histograms are similar among the respondents of both genders.
5.3 objective, subjective, and self-reported probabilities
In this section, we develop a model of reporting for the subjective
probabilities in the HRS. We are interested in comparing how these
subjective probabilities compare to objective predictions of survival,
based on within sample mortality. The objective prediction is based
on an estimated model of survival, based on the literature on duration
analysis. Our subjective model is parametrized in the same manner.
2 For respondents younger than 65, probability questions with a target age of 75 and 85
are asked. In what follows, we model on the response to the probability question with
a target age of 75. Including the information from the second question would certainly
be desirable for future work, but would require particular attention as we expect
a prediction made more than 20 years in the future to be noisier than a prediction
concerning a shorter horizon.
3 In this paper, we do not account for selection due to item-nonresponse to the prob-
ability questions. Since we compare actual mortality of individuals who provide a
response to the subjective probability question this is less of a concern than when
using life-tables. Note that respondents could explicitly answer "Don’t know" to
the probability question. These respondents, representing about 5% of the complete
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(b)
Figure 5.2: Histograms of the self-reported probabilities of survival to various
target ages for women (a) and men (b). The target age depends on
the respondent’s age, hence respondents in the same sub-ﬁgures
are close in age.5.3 objective, subjective, and self-reported probabilities 73
Thus, by analyzing the differences between the objective and subjec-
tive models, we can test the hypothesis that the expectations of the
respondents can be described as rational, by testing the null hypothe-
sis that the parameters are equal in both cases. The estimates of the
objective model are obtained based on the last known survival status
of the respondents, as described in Section 5.3.1. To ﬁt a model of
subjective survival, we use the probability questions discussed in the
previous section. Our approach to do so is described in Section 5.3.2.
However, an additional difﬁculty must be taken into account: the use
by respondents of rounding and focal answers to express their sur-
vival probabilities, apparent in the histograms in Figure 5.2. To take
this reality into account, we consider that the self-reported survival
probability from current age a to target age t is a rounded value of the
real underlying subjective probability. We discuss in Section 5.3.3 the
model used to capture this phenomenon.
The remainder of this section introduces these three parts of our
model:
1. A model for the objective hazard to predict survival among a
population of respondents with given characteristics;
2. A model for the subjective hazard perceived by respondents,
and for which the objective hazard is a special case;
3. A model of reporting, to take into account the rounding behavior
of the respondents.
Then, Section 5.3.4 lays down explicitly the resulting likelihood
function and Section 5.3.5 describes how this model can be interpreted
in terms of individual subjective survival curves.
5.3.1 Objective hazard
We ﬁrst deﬁne what the respondents should expect objectively, as
a group. Our approach to measuring the objective hazard consists
in estimating a survival model based on the mortality within our
sample. As we already saw in Figure 5.1, the mortality within our
sample is different from mortality at a national level. Thus, the use
of within-sample mortality allows us to control for possible selection
biases that could occur in this analysis for various reasons, such as
non-response or explicit selection criteria (e.g. respondents in nursing
homes could not enter the survey in the ﬁrst time period). We also
want to take into account that respondents entering the sample at
older ages are, on average, less frail than respondents who entered
at younger ages, due to dynamic selection. Additionally, the use of
within-sample mortality allows us to add a socio-economic gradient
in mortality risk, something that cannot be achieved with nationally
representative life-tables. The fact that we allow hazard rates to vary74 Individual Survival Curves
according to observable characteristics allows us to test group-level
rationality, as discussed below.
Consider the case of respondent i, aged a at the time when he
answers the question concerning his probability of survival to age
t. We are interested in the probability that the age of death of the
















where lO(tjxi) is the baseline objective hazard of respondents with
characteristics xi, LO
a (tjxi) is the integrated objective hazard from
age a to age t, and nO
i is a frailty term added to capture unobserved
heterogeneity (unobserved to the econometrician). Given that we
observe respondents’ survival status over a given period of time
(which may include age t, but may not), the estimation of a parametric
model of objective survival is straightforward and many statistical
packages provide routines to do so.
We consider a continuous model with a Gompertz hazard.4 The
Gompertz hazard at age t, for a respondent with characteristics xi,
constant over time, is given by:
lO(tjxi) = exp(xizO)exp(aOt) a0 > 0. (5.2)
Respondents in the sample are all aged 50 or more and we do not
observe death prior to that age. We therefore use age 50 as our origin
(initial time at risk). The integrated hazard from the initial time period
(notice that we omit the subscript a in this case) is then given by:
LO(tjxi) =
exp(xizO)
aO (exp(aOt)   1). (5.3)
Finally, we make the assumption that the individual frailty term nO
is distributed with a gamma distribution with unit expectation at the
origin. This parametric function depends on one parameter dO, and
has a variance equals to 1/dO.
4 We chose the Gompertz speciﬁcation as yields the best results to predict survival,
based on a likelihood criterion. In order to test the robustness of our analysis to this
parametric assumption, we also tried a Weibull hazard. The results we obtained were
quantitatively very similar to the ones obtained with the Gompertz speciﬁcation,
and are therefore not reported in this paper. We chose parametric speciﬁcations of
the baseline hazard over a semi-parametric piece-wise constant hazard because of
the small sample of deaths at older ages (yielding high variance in the form of the
hazard at older ages). The shape of the piece-wise constant hazard at younger ages
was indistinguishable in terms of ﬁt from a Gompertz speciﬁcation.5.3 objective, subjective, and self-reported probabilities 75
Under this assumption, we can derive the expected survival proba-
























We estimate this objective likelihood using the longest duration
available for the 18,791 respondents. Each respondent is observed last
at a given age, either the age at death or the age at the last interview
when the respondent is still alive. We denote this age by tO
i . We observe
respondent i entering the survey at age ai, leading to a left-censoring
problem. Additionally, as some respondents are still alive at time
tO
i , we must also consider right censoring. Therefore, the likelihood
contribution of an individual i is given by:
LO(zO,aO,dOjxi,ai,tO




where di is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is
deceased at time tO
i .
5.3.2 Subjective hazard
The parametric assumptions used in the subjective hazard model are
the same as in the objective hazard case. We use the superscript S
to denote the subjective parameters. The use of the same parametric
speciﬁcation gives us a direct test of rationality. Should the agents
be rational, their subjective and objective hazards would be equal.
Thus, using the same parametric speciﬁcation gives us a direct test of
rationality by testing the difference between the objective and subjec-76 Individual Survival Curves















While estimating the model, however, we are interested in the dif-
ferences between the objective and subjective parameters. In order to
make interpretation and testing easier, we redeﬁne the problem in the
following way:
aS = aO + ya (5.7)
zS = zO + y (5.8)
dS = dO + yd. (5.9)
Hence, we deﬁne our test of rational expectations as testing the null
hypothesis that all elements of y, ya, and yd are equal to 0.
For reasons that will become clear below, we also need to derive the
distribution of the subjective expectations conditional on being alive
at time a. Let us denote Fs(sSjT > a,xi), the distribution function of
the subjective survival probability conditional on surviving to age a.
Given our previous assumptions, it is easier to recast the problem in
term of Fns(vjT > a,xi), the distribution of nS conditional on surviving
to time a:







   T > a,xi

To simplify the notation, let us denote d = d 1 and emphasize that
nS at the origin follows a distribution Gamma(d,d), which given the
value of d, implies a gamma distribution with unit expectation. The
distribution of nS conditional on being alive at age a can therefore be
derived in the following manner:
5 We assume that nO and nS are independent, omitting the fact that respondents with
lower objective survival probabilities due to unobserved heterogeneity are also more
likely to report lower subjective probabilities. Given the complexity of taking this
relation explicitly into account, we leave this for future research.5.3 objective, subjective, and self-reported probabilities 77
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Hence, with this speciﬁcation, both the expected value of the frailty
term and its variance decrease with age, due to the increasing inte-
grated hazard. This is due to the dynamic selection, where frailer
respondents are more likely to die at younger age than healthier in-
dividuals. As individuals age, those who survive are more likely to
be among those with a low frailty, explaining both the decrease in
conditional expected value and conditional variance of the frailty term
compared to the initial period.
5.3.3 Rounding and self-reported probabilities
Given the large number of self-reported probabilities with values of 0,
0.5, or 1 observed in the sample, it seems important to correct for the
reporting behavior of the respondents. This was already acknowledged
in the GHM model, relying on a censored normal distribution to
update the prior distribution. This distribution, however, did not
correct for the reported probabilities of 50%.
We assume that the self-reported probability piat is a rounded report
of sS
a(tjxi,nS
i ). We use a reporting model of the latent-variable type,
comparable to the one presented by Heijtan and Rubin (1990,1991) or
Kleinjans and van Soest (2010). We do not know the rounding rule
used by the respondents. The problem of unknown rounding is quite
simple in nature, and is comparable to a problem of unknown mixture
of distributions. Suppose that we observe a respondent answering 25%
to a probability question. The answer could be the result of rounding
of a subjective probability in the [12.5, 37.5) range, rounding at the
nearest multiple of 25. It could also come from the [22.5, 27.5) range if
a respondent rounded to the nearest multiple of 5, or even from the
[24.5,25.5) range should a respondent give a very precise answer. Based78 Individual Survival Curves
on distributional assumptions, we can estimate a model predicting the
probability to use various rules. We consider the following rules:
1. Throw-away 50%-points, where respondents use 50%-points in
order to avoid answering;6
2. Rounding to a multiple of 50%-points;
3. Rounding to a multiple of 25%-points;
4. Rounding to a multiple of 10%-points;
5. Rounding to a multiple of 5%-points;
6. Precise answers rounded at 1%-points.
We treat the rounding rule as an unknown random variable R. We
denote the realization of R with r, an integer from 1 to 6 according to
the above list. Hence, a higher value means a more precise answer or
less rounding. Each rounding rule leads to a set of admissible piat. This
set of admissible values is denoted by Wr. Finally, for each rounding
rule, a self-reported probability of piat can result from rounding of
values between lr(piat) and ur(piat). In cases where rounding is made
with equally spaced intervals, we would have lr(piat) = piat   er and
ur(piat) = piat + er, with er being one half of the rounding scale.
We are interested in estimating the probability of observing a self-
reported answer of piat given a subjective survival probability. The







1(piat 2 Wr)Prob(Ri = r,jzi)
 1(lr(piat)  sS
a(tjxi,nS
i ) < ur(piat)).
(5.10)
In order to estimate the probability of using one of these six round-
ing rules, we follow an approach similar to the one discussed by
Kleinjans and van Soest (2010). We consider that each respondent has
a “propensity to round”, which is represented by r
i . A higher value
for this variable implies that respondents are more likely to use a
precise rounding rule. To capture the propensity to round, we use an
ordered model. Speciﬁcally, we assume that:
r
i = zig + #i
6 While this rule is not rounding, strictly speaking, we treat this as any answer from
the interval [0,100] that is reported at the middle point. In this regard, we depart from
Kleinjans and van Soest (2010) who speciﬁcally modeled the probability of giving a
throw-away answer in a ﬁrst step, and then modeled rounding conditional on giving
a meaningful answer. Our approach differs by assuming that throw-away 50s are very
imprecise answers, not non-responses.5.3 objective, subjective, and self-reported probabilities 79
and that a respondent uses rounding regime r if mr 1 < r
i  mr,
where where m0 =  ¥, m1 = 0, and m6 = ¥. It follows that m2
to m5 are parameters to be estimated. We assume that #i follows a
standard normal distribution, leading to a model that is analogous to







1(piat 2 Wr)(F(mr   zig)   F(mr 1   zig))
 1(lr(priat)  sS
a(tjxi,nS
i ) < ur(piat)).
(5.11)
5.3.4 Likelihood
We estimate the model by maximum likelihood. The approach we take
is to maximize the probability of observing the self-reported answers
given by the respondents. Hence, the subjective likelihood is given by:
LS(zO,aO,dO,y,ya,yd,gjxi,ai,zi) = Pr(piatjxi,zi)






1(piat 2 Wr)(F(mr   zig)   F(mr 1   zig))
 (FS(ur(piat)jxi,T > a)   FS(lr(piat)jxi,T > a)).
(5.12)
Finally, remember that the objective parameters appear both in the
objective and subjective part, and that we want to test the difference
between the objective and subjective parameters. The simplest way to
test this difference is to jointly estimate the objective and subjective
models. The complete likelihood is given by:
ln L = ln LO + ln LS. (5.13)
This procedure does not change the estimation of the objective pa-
rameters, as objective estimates are ﬁxed by the objective part, and
the subjective parameters adjust to these values. This approach allows
us to correct for the fact that the objective parameters are estimated,
and that a two-step procedure where the objective parameters are
estimated ﬁrst and then plugged into the subjective part would under-
estimate the standard errors of the subjective parameters’ estimates.80 Individual Survival Curves
5.3.5 Subjective frailty and individual curves
One of the objectives of this paper is to generate individual subjective
survival curves for the respondents. Assuming that we knew the
value of nS
i , we could simply use the model estimated above to obtain
full survival curves with our estimated Gompertz hazard. However,
the model predicts a distribution of nS
i for a given piat rather than a
precise value for this term. In the remainder of the text, we focus on
the expected value of nS
i , conditional on the answer to the self-reported




0 uProb(piatju,xi,zi)fns(ujxi,T > a)du
Prob(piatjxi,zi)
. (5.14)
Focusing on the expected value of nS
i ignores an important piece
of information about the distribution of this term. In cases where a
respondent gave a very imprecise answer to the probability question,
the distribution of nS
i has a larger variance than in the case where the
respondent answered precisely. Nevertheless, the results presented in
the following section are based on the expected value of this term of
subjective frailty. A more complete analysis taking into account the
full distribution of nS
i is left for future work.
5.4 estimation results
We present in this section the results of the estimation of the model
introduced above. We ﬁrst discuss the results for the objective part
of the model, and then discuss the subjective part. The last parts of
the section describe the implications of our results in terms of life-
expectancy, with particular attention to a group of respondents for
whom life-tables are not speciﬁcally available: the respondents who
have ever smoked.
5.4.1 Objective survival curves
We ﬁrst discuss the objective model, used as a benchmark of rational
expectations for the respondents. Given that we focus on respondents
aged 50 or more, we use this age as the initial time at risk, and hence
estimate a model of survival from age a   50 to age t   50. The covari-
ates that we include, and that we use in all models through the paper,
are dummies taking a value of 1 if the respondent is, respectively, male,
black, or Hispanic. We then include dummies for education, indicating
if the highest educational achievement is a high school degree or a
college degree ("no degree" used as a reference). Additionally, we
include a dummy if the respondent has ever smoked, and two cohort
dummies if the respondent was born before 1930 or after 1940 (being5.4 estimation results 81
born between 1930 and 1939 is the reference group). The selected
covariates are variables that are known to inﬂuence mortality and that
are generally constant over time for a given respondent. An increase
in the parameters associated with these variables implies an increase
in hazard, and hence, a lower survival probability. Cohort dummies
are included in order to control for variations in survival probabilities
for older respondents that would not be captured by the observables
characteristic.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5.1 presents the result of the estimation of
the objective model. At ﬁrst glance, the demographic characteristics
all have the expected sign, although Hispanic is not signiﬁcant. An
interesting result is the fact that the predicted hazard increases for
younger cohorts. This would suggest a decrease in life-expectancy in
years to come, which is in line with Olshansky et al. (2005) but in con-
tradiction with what Manton et al. (2006) predict. However, this effect
could also be due to a selection problem. For instance, we previously
mentioned that the HRS samples from the non-institutionalized popu-
lation. Hence, a frail respondent aged 75 is more likely to be sampled
at that age than he is at later age. This would lead to a seemingly
healthier population from the older cohort, which is what we ﬁnd.
Generally, if frailer and older respondents decline to join the survey,
we would ﬁnd a hazard increasing with the more recent cohorts.
In Figure 5.3, we present individual curves for the respondents
born in 1940 or later and aged 50 to 53 –the youngest respondents of
our sample. We pooled these four ages together in order to have a
reasonable sample size. Curves are presented by gender. To illustrate
the heterogeneity in objective survival probabilities, each sub-graph
presents 3 curves: the median, 10th percentile and 90th percentile. For
the sake of comparison, we also include the period life-table survival
curve for the year the median respondent answered the survey. Given
the fact that life-tables concern the complete American population,
the percentiles for this ﬁgure are based on weighted estimates in HRS.
Subsequent ﬁgures give equal weight to each respondent.
While the median curve for the males seems relatively close to the
life-table prediction, our objective model predicts higher mortality
than expected for women. This ﬁnding was also observed by Hurd
and McGarry (2002) who reported that "Whereas women in the HRS
appear to underestimate their survival probability, they also died at
greater than expected rates (p. 983)."7 This ﬁnding highlights one of
the main advantages of the approach we propose here: even with a
nationally representative sample like the HRS, the life-tables may not
be a valid measure of within-sample survival probabilities. Deviation
7 We also performed sensitivity analysis using alternative speciﬁcations and estimating
the model separately by gender, and the mortality among women still remains higher
than predicted. Results obtained with these alternative speciﬁcations were hardly
different from the ones presented here.82 Individual Survival Curves
Table 5.1: Estimation results
Objective modela Subjective modelb Reporting model
(zO and aO) (y, ya, and yd) (g and mr)
Male 0.2864 -0.1642 0.0117
(0.0305) (0.0322) (0.0104)
Black 0.2367 -0.2399 -0.1021
(0.0413) (0.0438) (0.0150)
Hispanic -0.0943 0.4094 0.0018
(0.0604) (0.0641) (0.0206)
High School -0.2173 -0.0942 -0.0090
(0.0348) (0.0375) (0.0135)
College -0.3982 -0.1964 0.1853
(0.0361) (0.0386) (0.0135)
Ever Smoked 0.4572 -0.2755 0.0120
(0.0342) (0.0359) (0.0109)
Cohort Prior to 1930 -0.4508 0.2554 0.2132
(0.0570) (0.0639) (0.0128)






Immediate word recall (z-score) 0.0169
(0.0066)
Prop. of 0/50/100 in other quest. -1.285
(0.0212)








Standard errors in parentheses
a Survival model estimated using age 50 as initial time period.
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Men aged 50, born 1940+
Objective and life−table survival curves
Life−table Median
10th perc. 90th perc.
Figure 5.3: Comparison of the objective and of the life-table-based survival
curves. Percentiles in this ﬁgure were determined using HRS
weights.
from the life-tables in subjective expectations may not be due to an
erroneous prediction.
5.4.2 Subjective survival and reporting
We now discuss the core result of this paper: the estimation of the
full model of subjective expectations. The second column of Table 5.1
contains the main parameters of interest: the estimated subjective pa-
rameters y, ya, and yd, capturing the differences between the objective
and subjective parameters. Remember that we are interested in devia-
tions from the value 0. While it is difﬁcult to assess the importance of
the values of the parameters directly from their values, we will present
below some predicted subjective survival curves resulting from our
model, making it easier to picture the consequences of these varia-
tions in subjective hazards. Nevertheless, here are some preliminary
remarks.
First, notice that the variance of the frailty term is much larger
for the subjective frailty than it was for the objective frailty, meaning
that there seems to be higher perceived variation in health from the
respondents than what we found with objective mortality. Taking into
account the fact that the difference between aO and aS is quite small
and does not appear to be signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.497), and taking
into account that the difference in constant terms is larger than 0, it
appears that the subjective curves, unconditional on the individual84 Individual Survival Curves
frailty, are more pessimistic than the objective curves at younger ages.
However, due to dynamic selection, the unconditional curves tend to
be more and more optimistic as time goes by, eventually leading to
optimism at older ages.
Let us now consider the additional parameters to the model. The
covariates’ parameters can be seen as an additional correction toward
optimism or pessimism that would affect all time periods. With the
dynamic selection, however, each parameter individually cannot be
seen as a shift away from rational expectations. Still, we see that men,
black respondents, educated respondents (either with a high school or
college degree), respondents from the younger cohorts, and smokers
have a negative correction in their hazard. Only Hispanic respondents
have a signiﬁcant positive correction in their hazard, leading to lower
subjective survival rates than the other respondents, everything else
being held constant. It is again hard to interpret directly the meaning
of these parameters. Section 5.4.4 provides an analysis for the case of
smokers, illustrating the implication of our results.
We proposed above, as a test of rational expectations, to test whether
all the parameters capturing the differences between the objective and
subjective parameters are equal to 0. A Wald-test of joint signiﬁcance
rejects strongly the null hypothesis of rationality at any meaningful
signiﬁcance level. This result is not surprising given the difference in
variance between the objective and subjective frailty.
The results for the rounding model are presented in the last column.
We include two additional explanatory variables in the reporting
model. The ﬁrst one is based on the number of words that a respondent
could recall in a memory exercise, in order to capture cognitive skills.
The variable used is a period z-score, to correct for the varying number
of words asked in total and for possible variation in the difﬁculty of
the list in a given period. The second variable is the proportion of
answers that were multiples of 50 in the other probability questions of
the HRS. We ﬁnd that the variables male, Hispanic, high school, and
"ever smoked" do not have a signiﬁcant effect on rounding behavior,
and ﬁnd that college education and cognitive skills lead to respondents
giving more accurate answers. We also ﬁnd that a higher proportion of
focal answers in other HRS questions leads to a higher probability of
coarse rounding in the self-reported survival probability, reinforcing
the idea that some respondents are simply less prone to give "precise"
answers. Based on our results, we do not ﬁnd any support for the
idea that 50%-point answers are used to avoid answering questions.
In our model, the predicted probability of having this behavior is
practically nil for all respondents. On average, we predict that 33.7%
of the respondents round to the nearest multiple of 50, while 15.8% to
a multiple of 25, 37.8% to a multiple of 10, 11.0% to a multiple of 5,
and 1.7% are expected to report very precise answers.5.4 estimation results 85
Is rounding an important part of our model? To answer this ques-
tion, we estimated a model where we ﬁxed the propensity to report
precise answers at an arbitrarily large value, implying that respon-
dents reported their subjective probabilities with a 1%-point precision.
Results are not reported here but are available upon request. Among
the changes in the estimated parameters, one is very important: the
variance of the subjective frailty term is about twice as large when
we do not take rounding into account, increasing to a value of 2.56
with a standard error of 0.04. Other parameters seem to adjust to
this change. Given the histograms presented in Figure 5.2, this is not
surprising. The variation in frailty needed to accommodate the large
fraction of respondents who used 0% and 100% as answers must be
quite substantial. If we believe that respondents used rounding to
report their probability, which we think is fairly uncontroversial based
on the shape of the histograms, then not correcting for this rounding
would lead us to overstate the optimism of optimistic respondents and
the pessimism of the pessimistic respondents. We therefore believe
that it is better to correct for rounded answers.
As previously mentioned, it is hard to assess the implications of the
estimated parameters in Table 5.1. To illustrate graphically some of
our results, Figure 5.4 presents some of the subjective survival curves
resulting from the estimation of the full model. They also include the
objective survival curve of the median respondent. On the left, the two
sub-ﬁgures are not conditional on piat, the self-reported probabilities.
In this case, we do not have information on the subjective frailty term,
and we must therefore compute the curves based on Equation 5.4.
Note that the difference in these curves is only due to variation in
observable characteristics. The conditional curves on the right includes
the information contained in piat. For each respondent, we compute
the expected subjective frailty term as described in Equation 5.14 of
Section 5.3.5. The survival curves based on these values are computed.
Therefore, part of the variation in these curves is due to variation in
subjective frailty and part is due to differences in observable charac-
teristics.
Looking at the unconditional curves shows that observable charac-
teristics do not seem to explain much in terms of variation in subjective
probabilities. We see evidence that women appear to be relatively ra-
tional in their expectations concerning mortality, if we consider the
median curve. As expected, the unconditional curve is ﬂatter than
the objective curve. When looking at the conditional curves, we see
that the median objective and subjective curves are quite close. This
would imply that women are conscious of the higher-than-predicted
mortality risk. We also see evidence that men are optimistic. The
unconditional curves show evidence of lower expected mortality at
higher age, as we expected from Table 1. We see that the median con-
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Figure 5.4: Subjective survival curves unconditional and conditional on the re-
spondents’ self-reported probabilities (expected subjective frailty
used).
based on the shape of the unconditional curve, we can deduce that it
implies a strong asymmetry in frailty, hinting that a lot of men are very
optimistic and have curves close to the represented 90th percentile. We
also see from the dispersion of the curves that while the observable
characteristics account for only a small fraction of the heterogeneity,
conditioning on the self-reported probability increases considerably
the dispersion between the 10th and 90th percentile.
5.4.3 Subjective life-expectancy
For the study of pension and aging, the probability of survival at target
age tells only part of the relevant story. We are not only interested in
describing the perceived probability to be alive at a target age, but
are interested in determining, for instance, the number of years a
respondent expects to survive beyond retirement age.
Let us ﬁrst consider the life-expectancy of the respondents aged
50 to 53 in our sample. Figure 5.5 presents the predicted age of mor-
tality by gender both unconditional (ﬁrst column) and conditional
on probability answers (second column). As expected, considerable
variation comes from the answers to the probability questions. We
can see that the conditional histograms have peaks at some values,
driven by the fact that respondents tend to use rounded values in5.4 estimation results 87
their answers. Remember that we focus here only on the expected
values. It follows that respondents with similar characteristics and
reporting the same probability of survival have the same expected
subjective frailty, leading to the same subjective life-expectancy. In fact,
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of the conditional life-expectancy (in remaining years)
for the respondents aged 50-53, all cohorts combined.
In order to visualize the results obtained at various ages, consider
Figure 5.6 presenting the objective and subjective life-expectancy (the
number of years a respondent is predicted to survive) for all respon-
dents of our dataset. The ﬁgure presents smoothed trends for the
median objective survival prediction at each age, and then, smoothed
conditional subjective trends for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles,
by gender and cohort.
A ﬁrst striking result is how close the median subjective and median
objective lines are for all six sub-ﬁgures. As expected from Figure 5.4,
median respondents have subjective expectations that are quite close
to the objective ones. At ﬁrst glance, it may therefore be surprising
that we ﬁnd signs of optimism for certain groups of the population.
In order to explain this, we have to consider the dispersion of the
subjective years. We can see by looking at the 10th and 90th percentiles,
for instance, that there seems to be an asymmetry in the answers,
and that some respondents are quite optimistic without equivalently
pessimistic respondents. The trend seems even more pronounced at
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Figure 5.6: Objective and subjective life-expectancy (in remaining years) at
various ages, by gender and cohort5.4 estimation results 89
5.4.4 The case of smokers
We have already mentioned that one of the interesting features of our
approach is that it allows us to assess the effect of personal charac-
teristics on expected mortality, even if life-tables are not published
speciﬁcally for respondents with that characteristic. Let us consider
the case of smokers. The accuracy of the expectations of smokers was
previously studied by Khwaja et al. (2007) who found, using the HRS
and relying on a similar comparison between subjective and objective
probability of survival, that smokers tend to be optimistic concerning
their own survival probabilities. To relate this to our results, con-
sider Figure 5.7, presenting conditional subjective survival curves for
respondents aged 50 to 53 and from the 1940 cohort, but this time
presented separately whether they report ever smoking or not. We
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Figure 5.7: Subjective survival curves conditional on the respondents’ self-
reported probabilities (expected subjective frailty used) presented
separately for smokers and non-smokers.
Based on this picture, we would tend to say that median respondents
are rational concerning their survival probabilities. This would seem to
contradict the ﬁnding of Khwaja et al. (2007). However, it does not. To
illustrate this, we can can compute the ratio of predicted subjective life-
expectancy to predicted objective life-expectancy for every respondent.
Let us consider the mean value of this ratio for the four groups of
respondents from Figure 5.7. For women who never smoked, we ﬁnd
a value of 1.000 as a mean value for the ratio. This value is 1.024 for90 Individual Survival Curves
men who never smoked. This hints that these two groups are, on
average, quite rational, although testing formally the signiﬁcance of
these results is not straightforward, given that we consider the mean of
the ratio of two random variables. The picture is different for smokers.
The mean value of this ratio is respectively 1.102 and 1.121 for women
and men. On average, predicted subjective life expectancy is about 10%
higher than predicted objective life expectancy for smokers. Hence,
while we ﬁnd that the median respondent is somehow rational, the
distribution is skewed. On this topic, let us mention that Khwaja et al.
(2007) compared former and current smokers, and found that those
who are no longer smoking tend to be pessimistic, while those still
smoking are optimistic. This could explain the result that we obtain.
5.5 conclusion
In this paper, we extend the framework of Gan et al. (2005) so that
it allows us to test formally the hypothesis of rational expectations,
using subjective survival expectations and observed mortality, and to
recover individual subjective survival curves. Our model also explicitly
takes rounding behavior into account. Our analysis revealed a general
increase of optimism over time, captured by a strong dynamic selection
in subjective survival probabilities. We also found that education,
gender, and race are important factors in determining optimism, and
found evidence that smokers underestimate the effect of smoking.
We found a higher mortality among women than is predicted by the
life-tables. However, we found that women seem to anticipate this, as
median survival predictions are quite rational for that group. Finally,
we conclude that the heterogeneity contained in the subjective answers
to probability questions is substantial, and unaccounted for by the
other characteristics used in our model.
An important problem that must be addressed in future work is the
problem of non-response in subjective probability questions. While
our approach allows us to control for selection within the sample, this
selection problem limits the extent to which we can generalize our
results to the whole population. We could extend our current frame-
work to try to predict the subjective expectations of those who refused
to answer this question. Additionally, we could exploit the fact that
respondents answered the survey multiple times, or even answered
more than one question at once, to include a panel dimension in our
model.
Finally, and more importantly, we will also consider applications
of these individual subjective survival curves to projections of life
expectancy and to the understanding of old-age consumption and
saving decisions. A good application for our survival curves consists
in analyzing the market for annuities or life-insurance. We could
assume, for instance, that banks and insurance ﬁrms base their pricing5.6 acknowledgements 91
on the objective mortality curves, whereas the individuals use their
own subjective beliefs concerning their survival probabilities in order
to decide whether to annuitize or insure themselves. The subjective
optimism that we ﬁnd would have important implications for these
decisions.
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USING STATED-PREFERENCE DATA TO ESTIMATE
A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF RETIREMENT AND
SAVINGS
6.1 introduction
It is well documented that populations of developed countries are
aging, a trend casting doubt on whether the current pension systems
are sustainable. To curb the cost of social security, political reforms
are needed around the world. For instance, in the Netherlands, where
the dependence ratio is projected to double by 2040 to around 2:5
(see Bovenberg and Gradus, 2008), measures were already taken to
reduce the cost of the system by delaying eligibility to social security
(known as AOW, in Dutch) by two full years. Predicting how people
will react to these reforms is quite challenging. Will they decide to
delay retirement by a full two years? Will they save more in order to
be able to retire as early as they used to? Or will they, as economic
theory would predict in many cases, use a mix of these two solutions
in their retirement planning? The life-cycle theory helps us to evaluate
behavioral adjustment. To obtain quantitative predictions based on
a life cycle model, we need to calibrate or to estimate the preference
parameters. Doing so is not a trivial task and usually requires a
substantial amount of information on individuals’ characteristics, their
behavior, and their pension plans.
There is a vast literature on estimation of preferences for retirement
based on survey data. A frequently used approach is to assume that a
survey respondent evaluates the beneﬁts of retiring at various ages,
for instance every year between age 60 and 70, and that the planned
retirement age is the one with the highest value. International com-
parisons of preferences for retirement are available in two volumes
edited by Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) based on the option-value
model of Stock and Wise (1990). An alternative literature estimates
structural retirement models derived from the life-cycle theory (see
for instance Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986; Rust and Phelan, 1997).
In many cases, however, the information needed to estimate these
complex models, such as the values of assets or detailed descriptions
of retirement plans, are not available to most empirical analysts.
Even when these important data are available, one of the main
challenges in estimating detailed retirement models is to characterize
correctly the choice set of the economic agents. While we may have in-
formation on behavior under his actual plan, and while for a given set
of parameters we can forecast how he would act under an alternative
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plan, the challenge for an empirical analyst is to characterize the set of
alternative retirement trajectories as perceived by the respondents. For
instance, some respondents may not perceive an alternative trajectory
as being available to them. In the case of the Netherlands, reaching
age 65 is a legitimate reason for dismissal, so respondents may not
perceive that retiring beyond that age is within their choice set. More-
over, it is hard to impute a correct expected replacement rate for the
feasible ages of retirement that are not chosen by a respondent.
Beyond that, even characterizing the perceived actual retirement
trajectory may be quite challenging. There is substantial evidence that
many individuals do not understand their own retirement plans (e.g.
Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005) or lack the ﬁnancial knowledge needed
to understand complex ﬁnancial decisions (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell,
2007). Therefore, when we observe respondents’ behavior, we may not
be able to know exactly what respondents are reacting to, as disentan-
gling preferences and expectations may turn out to be particularity
challenging (see Hurd, 2009, for a review of retirement expectations).
Suppose that we observe an individual with very low savings for
retirement. It is impossible, based on this observation, to say whether
this behavior is due to a strong preference for present consumption,
to the individual’s expectation that the pension plan will be generous,
or to a low preference for leisure. This is particularly problematic if
we want to study retirement planning of relatively young respondents
who make decisions concerning a very long horizon with substantial
uncertainty.
In this paper, I explore an alternative approach to the estimation
of retirement models based on the life-cycle theory, namely the use
of stated-preference data where respondents are asked to evaluate
hypothetical retirement paths. In this case, all the relevant information
concerning the hypothetical scenarios is presented to the respondents,
so that the choice set is completely observed. The main objective of
this paper is to assess how the respondents’ stated preferences can
be translated in terms of a simple structural model of retirement and
savings. The estimated model is then used to simulate a two-year delay
in eligibility to social security in line with the proposed policy reform
in the Netherlands. Studies based on this idea have been presented
before by van Soest et al. (2006) and Voˇ nková and van Soest (2009),
but they did not use the stated preference data to estimate a structural
life-cycle model. This study partly uses the same data that were used
in Voˇ nková and van Soest (2009).
There are many conceptual advantages of the stated-preference ap-
proach to estimate the parameters of the proposed life-cycle model.
First, I mentioned above that characterizing the full choice set of the
respondents is very challenging in a revealed-preference analysis, as
there is rarely information available on the suboptimal retirement
paths. In a case where the respondents are asked to evaluate multiple6.1 introduction 97
retirement paths, I do not have this problem. Second, the fact that em-
pirical analysts can experimentally change the hypothetical scenarios
allows us to induce variation that is not naturally present. For instance,
it is possible to inquire about multiple replacement rates that do not
correspond to the rates a respondent faces. Doing so helps to disentan-
gle the effects of various preferences (e.g. preferences, risk aversion,
preference for leisure). Similarly, it would allow us to evaluate which
policy reform would be preferred among a list of possible changes
without actually implementing these reforms. Third, the hypothetical
scenarios allow us to reduce uncertainty (combining the roles of pref-
erences and expectations for the empirical analyst), as the retirement
paths presented to the respondents have no uncertainty in the level
of retirement income. Finally, the fact that we can ask respondents to
evaluate multiple scenarios provides us with richer information on
preferences than in the case where only the preferred choice of the
respondent is observed.
Economists have usually been reluctant to use subjective data such
as stated-preferences. Discussions on this topic are presented, for
instance, by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) or Dominitz and van
Soest (2008). Common objections include the fear that respondents
may under- or over-state their preferences for a certain outcome when
asked hypothetical questions (mostly in cases were some answers are
seen as socially desirable), that they may not be willing to answer
the questions honestly, or that they will not think carefully about
their answers. These are certainly valid concerns. In the application
that I propose here, however, the hypothetical scenarios are easy to
understand and I would argue that there is no socially desirable
answer. Therefore, I believe that it is worthwhile to investigate the
information contained in these stated preferences.
Most importantly, I do not want to argue that stated-preference data
should substitute for revealed-preference data. The ultimate aim of
this research is to propose a means to complement the information
contained in revealed preferences. For instance, the additional data
may allow estimation of parameters that are otherwise poorly identi-
ﬁed, or we could use stated-preference data to construct additional
moment conditions in the estimation of a model of retirement. I there-
fore believe that it is relevant to investigate the information contained
in these answers, keeping in mind that I will want to combine this
information with more traditional sources in future research. At this
stage, however, my main question is whether this source of informa-
tion yields plausible estimates of the model if we only rely on it for
the estimation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2
describes the data used in this paper. Section 6.3 introduces the eco-
nomic model, and then explains an econometric approach to estimate
the parameters of this model. Section 6.4 presents the results of the98 Using stated-preference data...
estimation. Section 6.5 presents some simulations based on the esti-
mated model, illustrating the implications of the results. Section 6.6
concludes.
6.2 data
I ﬁrst introduce the data I use in this paper, as the information available
will dictate the form of the empirical model. The main datasets used
are available from CentERdata, an institute afﬁliated with Tilburg
University. The data belong to the CentERpanel, an ongoing internet
panel of about 2000 households in a given time period. Respondents
to the panel are sampled to be representative of the Dutch population.
Measures are even taken to ensure that families without access to the
Internet can still be included in the sample.1
6.2.1 Hypothetical scenarios and stated-preferences
The main dataset used for this research is the Netspar Pension Barometer
Survey. The Pension Barometer Survey is an ongoing high-frequency
panel interested, as its name implies, in various perceptions concerning
the future of retirement. Among the themes studied via this panel
are expectations (e.g. Van der Wiel, 2008, 2009; Bissonnette and van
Soest, 2011), satisfaction with pension (e.g. De Bresser and van Soest,
2009), and the perception of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis (e.g. Bissonnette
and van Soest, 2010). I focus my attention on the yearly survey sent to
respondents in the years 2006 to 2008.
In these waves, respondents were asked to evaluate various retire-
ment scenarios using a 10-point scale (1 being "very unattractive" and
10, "very attractive"). Respondents were asked to report what they
would think of hypothetical retirement plans if they were offered to
them. These scenarios were adapted to the situation of the respondents.
For instance, respondents were asked in a prior question to report the
number of hours worked weekly, and this information was used in the
deﬁnition of the number of hours worked until retirement. I analyze
three scenarios concerning retirement at ages 62, 65, and 68. For each
of these scenarios, respondents were told that they would work the
same number of hours as they do now, and were offered randomly
a given replacement rate after retirement.2 After a short introduction
explaining the stated preference set-up, the following questions were
asked (with everything between square brackets replaced by a relevant
value):
1 More information on the CentERpanel is available via the CentERdata website:
www.centerdata.nl/en
2 Deﬁned beneﬁts pensions are widespread in the Netherlands, so expressing retire-
ment beneﬁts in terms of a unique replacement rate of x% is not unusual for our
respondents. See Appendix 6.B for a discussion on this topic.6.2 data 99
What do you think about the following possibilities? Please
provide answers on a scale from 1 (very unattractive) to 10
(very attractive).
You work [current working hours] till age [r], retiring fully
at age [r] with a disposable pension income of [x]% of your
last net earnings.
Respondents were assigned randomly a set of replacement rates
for these scenarios. For instance, in 2006 or 2007, respondents could
receive either low values for all three scenarios (45% for retirement at
age 62, 60% at age 65, and 80% at age 68), medium values for these
scenarios (50%, 65%, 85%), or high values (55%, 70%, 90%). Values
were slightly different in 2008 to allow for additional variation, but
respondents would still receive either low, medium, or high values
in all scenarios. Over the 3 waves of the panel, respondents therefore
faced one of six sets of replacements rates (i.e. either low, medium, or
high with the values in 2006-7 or 2008). This experimentally induced
variation in replacement rates will play a key role in identifying
the preference parameters of the model. Respondents were told to
interpret the replacement rate of a given retirement scenario as a
substitute for social security and professional pension (the ﬁrst and
second pillar pension). Pension entitlements in the Netherlands are
typically presented in this integrated manner, for example in the
annual overviews provided by the occupational pension funds (c.f.
OECD, 2011).3
6.2.2 Households and their assets
I allow respondents to accumulate assets to save for retirement. In
turn, this implies that I must take into account the accumulated assets
at the time respondents evaluate the scenario. While this information
is not available in the Pension Barometer Survey, it is available for
most respondents through the Dutch National Bank Household Survey
(henceforth DHS), another yearly survey from CenterData administered
to the same respondents panel. The deﬁnition of wealth I use in this
paper is simply the sum of the value of different assets included
in the DHS. A complete list of the assets included is included in
Appendix 6.A.4 Analysis of these assets can be found, for instance,
3 One of the main advantages of the stated-preference approach used in this paper
is the simplicity of the future that respondents have to evaluate. The scenarios do
not require institutional knowledge of the pension system or understanding of their
current retirement scheme (see for instance Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005). I refer
readers interested in comparing the theoretical and hypothetical pensions plans to
Appendix 6.B.
4 For this analysis, I excluded housing wealth and mortgage debt, due to two issues.
First, there seem to be problems with the measurement of these values in the DHS.
Second, including housing would require modiﬁcations to the theoretical model100 Using stated-preference data...
in Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2002), Euwals, Eymann, and
Börsch-Supan (2004) or Bissonnette and van Soest (2010).
One of the limitations of the paper is that the scenarios were phrased
in terms of individual behavior rather than in terms of household
behavior, while the value of assets is deﬁned at the household level.
Ideally, scenarios would also explicitly describe the spouse’s behavior.
Hence, due to data limitations, I cannot estimate a full model of
retirement for the couples (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004).
Moreover, information in the Pension Barometer Survey and in the
DHS is not always available for each member of the household. In
order to include as many respondents as possible, I decided to di-
vide equally household wealth and income among the two household
members.5 This will probably underestimate the retirement cost of
the high earner and overestimate the retirement cost of the low earner.
However, not accounting for other household members’ income would
clearly overestimate the consumption of the highest earner and un-
derestimate consumption of the lower earner. A better analysis of
household behavior is a step that will require further investigation
and data, in future research. In the current study, I restrict the sample
to singles and couples where both members are observed. Then, each
respondent is allocated the mean income within the couple and half
of the total values of the assets.
After restricting the respondents to singles and "half-couples" aged
less than 61, merging the dataset with the DHS, and removing ob-
servations with insufﬁcient information, I retain a sample of 607
respondents, forming a panel of 963 respondent-year observations.
6.2.3 A descriptive analysis of stated-preferences
In this subsection I present a descriptive analysis of the stated-preference
data for the selected households. Although respondents were asked
to evaluate the scenarios on a 10-point scale, the information that I
exploit in this paper is the preference relation between the three sce-
narios. Hence, if a respondent evaluated the scenario with retirement
at 62 with a 4, the one with retirement at 65 with a 7, and the one
with retirement at 68 with a value of 6, my focus will be that the value
of the second scenario, denoted V65, is larger than the value of the
scenario at 68, V68, in turn larger than the value of retirement at 62,
going beyond the scope of this paper. If houses are considered as assets, then I would
either need to establish a utility beneﬁt of holding a house (or a housing cost for the
respondents who do not own a house) or assume that houses are assets with a very
high rate of return to compensate for mortgage cost. The implicit assumption in my
model is that agents may derive utility from owning a house and that the price of
this good is the mortgage paid over the years, part of the Hicksian good.
5 This assumes that all consumption is private; an alternative would be to assume that
all consumption is public, leading to twice as high consumption amounts for both
partners. This factor two does not change anything in the empirical results since
transitions into widowhood etc. are not considered.6.2 data 101
V62. As I explain in detail in Section 6.3.2 below, I do so in order to
avoid modelling the reporting procedure respondents used to map
their value to a ten point-scale. This procedure has the advantage of
being robust to systematic pessimism or optimism in reporting.
Table 6.1 presents the distribution of the rankings as observed in
the sample. As explained above, in 2006 and 2007, respondents were
allocated randomly one of three sets of replacement rates and the
values of these replacement rates were changed in 2008. Therefore,
over the years, respondents had to evaluate scenarios with one of six
sets of replacement rates. Each of the ﬁrst six columns of the table
corresponds to the six different sets of replacement rates that were pre-
sented to the respondent. The seventh column pools all respondents,
irrespective of their replacement rates. This table ignores the fact that
some respondents are observed more than once over time.
Let us consider the last column ﬁrst. We see that across the scenarios,
the ranking observed most frequently is such that retiring at 68 is
preferred to retiring at 65, in turn preferred to retiring at 62. If we
focus on this result only, it would indicate that late retirement is
the favored option. It is not exactly so. Let us consider only cases
where the preferred option is known (respondents from the ﬁrst
nine rows) (excluding the 139 respondents for whom only the least
preferred option is known and the 135 respondents for whom no
ranking is available). Out of these 689 respondents, 21.9% prefer the
scenario with retirement at 62, 39.3% prefer retirement at 65, and
38.8% prefer late retirement. Hence, if we exclude the ties among
the favoured options, about as many respondents prefer standard
and late retirement. Among the cases with a tie between the two
preferred scenarios, 59.0% expressed that early retirement was the
least preferred option, 8.6% chose standard retirement and 32.3%
chose late retirement. While it is clear that early retirement is the least
preferred option among the three scenarios, it seems that the fraction
of respondents preferring standard and late retirement are about the
same.
As expected, variations in the generosity of hypothetical pension
plans seems to have an effect on the stated choices. We also see that
in the ﬁrst column, where early replacement rates are the lowest,
respondents express a preference for late retirement, chosen by 48%
of the 163 respondents for whom the preferred option is known. To
illustrate the impact of a variation in replacement rates, consider the
sixth column with more generous replacement rates for all scenarios.
In this case, most respondents prefer standard retirement (51% of 164
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6.2.4 Additional data to construct the future
While a lot of information is available through the two sources de-
scribed above, solving the life cycle optimization problem requires
some additional assumptions, in order to construct the full income
paths and to describe their mortality risks. I describe these elements
here. Please note that all variables are described in terms of real values,
as I do not consider inﬂation in the model.
Given that the pension income is described in terms of the replace-
ment rate of the yearly wage, the major challenge is to construct
sensible wage paths for the respondents. Ideally one would prob-
ably ask the respondents about their own expected last earnings –
information that will be available in subsequent waves of the Pension
Barometer Survey but is not yet available in the waves used here. An
alternative is to rely on an external prediction of income growth. I use
this approach, and calibrate my model based on the results of Knoef,
Alessie, and Kalwij (2009), who present microsimulations of income
growth in the Netherlands. I use their ﬁnding that they expect the
growth of real income of the 50-64 to be 0.6% between 2008 and 2020.
I therefore impute this income growth to every individual. A more
reﬁned projection by characteristics such as education or by quantile
of income is left for future research.
Another problem concerns the expected real interest rate. For this
part, I follow standard practice and present a sensitivity analysis using
various assumed values. I hence assume that respondents all expect
the same interest rate.
Finally, the theoretical model includes the survival probabilities
to various ages. The best approach here would again be to consider
heterogeneous subjective survival ages, using information revealed
by the respondents (e.g. Gan, Hurd, and McFadden, 2005). For the
sake of simplicity, however, I consider that all respondents of a given
age and gender have similar mortality expectations. To determine the
probability of survival, I consider the cohort life-tables as forecasted
by Statistics Netherlands (in Dutch: CBS).6
6.3 life-cycle model
The main objective of this paper is to estimate a structural model of
retirement and savings based on the valuation of retirement scenarios
6 The life-tables contain forecasts of mortality until 2060, meaning that projections of
survival probabilities are not known toward the end of the life course for respondents
born later than 1960. In order to circumvent this problem, I assign the last predicted
survival probability to younger cohorts. For instance, the last predicted probability of
survival to age 85 is for a respondents born in 1975. Respondents born after that year
are assigned the same probability of survival as those born in 1975. Given that these
later periods are quite substantially discounted in the model, this approach should
have only a limited impact on the estimation results.104 Using stated-preference data...
described in the previous section. I present in this section the approach
I use to do so. I ﬁrst introduce the underlying economic model, then,
discuss the econometric approach used to estimate the parameters of
the theoretical model.
6.3.1 The economic model
The problem faced by the agent in the model is fairly common in
the life-cycle theory (see, e.g., Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Browning
and Crossley, 2001). Let us denote the consumption, leisure, and
accumulated assets at the end of period t by Ct, Lt, and At respectively.
In this paper, Lt can only take the values 0 or 1, as respondents
either work or are retired. Extension to partial retirement would
be straightforward, as discussed by Gustman and Steinmeier (2005).
Additionally, let us denote sat the probability to survive from age a to






sat rt a u(Ct, Lt) (6.1)
where r is a discount factor to capture preference for present con-
sumption. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that respondents have
a probability of survival to age 68 equal to 1. After that, there is a
positive probability of dying at each time period. This assumption is
made to avoid additional assumptions concerning the credit market
under an uncertain lifespan (see Yaari, 1965, for an early example).
In a case where agents could borrow money with uncertain survival
status, the interest rate would need to be a function of the survival
probabilities of the agents, meaning that the interest paid on a one-year
loan would increase as a respondent ages.
Let wt be the wage for time period t, pt(r) the pension amount
received at time t for a given retirement age r, and let i denote the real
interest rate. Respondents face the following constraints:
(1+ i)At 1 + wt(1  Lt) + pt(r)Lt  At + Ct t = a...T
(6.2)
At  0 t = r...T.
(6.3)
The ﬁrst constraint is a conventional budget constraint. The second
constraint states that while respondents are allowed from borrowing
against their future wages, I do not allow them to borrow against their
future pension income. It is often assumed that respondents must
hold positive asset values at each time period. However, I observe
many respondents with debts in the current time period. I therefore
decided to allow respondents to borrow against their future wage.
As mentioned above, however, I decided to prevent respondents to6.3 life-cycle model 105
borrow in the years with uncertain survival status in order to keep
the credit market simple. I therefore make the simplifying assumption
that respondents enter retirement without debts.7
One of the implicit assumptions of this model is that there is no
bequest motive (see, e.g., Hurd, 1989), and that hence:
AT = 0.
There may still be some accidental bequests should a respondent
pass away while holding wealth. I assume, however, that a respondent
derives no utility from this bequest.
As for the utility function, I use a separable utility function with
constant relative risk aversion for consumption. This function was cho-
sen for the sake of comparability with structural estimations reviewed






t + lLt (6.4)
where the parameters g and l vary across individuals according
to respondents’ characteristics, as discussed below in Section 6.3.2.
When speciﬁed in this way, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion for
consumption is equal to 1   g. With this speciﬁcation, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is given by 1
1 g. For g = 0 the model
becomes a model with logarithmic utility.
6.3.1.1 Solving the agent’s problem
In order to determine the ranking of the scenarios for a given respon-
dent, we need to determine the optimal asset allocation over time
for a given set of parameters and for given initial ﬁnancial wealth,
retirement age, and incomes before and after retirement. In the simple
model considered here, the only source of uncertainty is the survival
status of a respondent in the future. The problem is therefore com-
putationally easy to solve and is akin to a model where the future is
discounted with a time varying factor.
Finding the optimal solution for this simple problem can be achieved
by solving the system of ﬁrst order conditions. In a case where there
is no borrowing constraint, the problem consists in solving a simple
system of linear equations. Doing so allows us to ﬁnd an analytical
solution to the consumption at the initial time period that can, in turn,
be used to solve for the other time periods. However, I want to prevent
the agents from borrowing against their pensions. To deal with this
condition, I ﬁrst solve the problem for all time periods from a to T
without taking into account the constraint that ﬁnancial assets must
7 To some extent, this assumption seems to be in line with what is observed in the
dataset, in which I observe 12% of working individuals and 5% of retired individuals
with negative assets value.106 Using stated-preference data...
have a non-negative value after retirement. Should the solution violate
the non-negativity condition, I set AT 1 equal to 0 and re-solve the
system for the ﬁrst T   a   2 decisions. I repeat this procedure until I
ﬁnd the ﬁrst admissible solution.
The assumptions made in the current paper lead to a very simple
solution to the optimization problem faced by the agents. In future
research, adding more sources of uncertainty, such as income or health
uncertainty, would clearly enhance the interest of the model. Indeed,
the stated-preference approach presented here would be an interesting
avenue to study these sources of uncertainty. We could, for instance,
vary experimentally the risk of unemployment or of deteriorating
health, and measure how respondents react.
6.3.2 The econometric model
While working with revealed preferences often forces econometricians
to estimate a model based only on the alternative providing the highest
utility to a respondent, the use of stated preferences allows us to
use more information concerning preferences. In the analysis of the
same dataset, Voˇ nková and van Soest (2009) exploited the fact that
respondents used a response scale from 1 to 10 as a measure of the
level of preferences, and estimated a multivariate ordered probit. I use
an alternative approach here and only consider the ordering of the
answers, ranking alternatives according to preference relations. My
main motivation for doing so is that there is no straightforward way
to map the value of the utility function to a valuation system from 1
to 10. Consider for instance the case of two identical respondents, but
at different ages. Even in the absence of a stochastic element in the
model, these respondents would have different values for the various
scenarios, although they are likely to rank the scenarios in the same
way.
The implicit assumption made is that reported answers are an
unspeciﬁed monotonic transformation of the intrinsic value held by
respondents for a particular scenario. In some cases, the transformation
leads respondents to report the same value for various scenarios. In
such cases, the answers are considered as uninformative. I discuss
below how I deal with such observations.
I assume a simple model of random utility where the value of a
scenario at a given age a, with retirement age r, is given by:













Note that when considering a given retirement scenario r, the value of
Lt is equal to 1 of r  t and to 0 otherwise.6.3 life-cycle model 107
Observable characteristics enter the model through the parameters
g and l in equation (6.4). The parameter of risk aversion g varies only
with the gender of the respondent. This parameter has a value of g0 for
women and g0 +gmale for men. On the other hand, the marginal utility
of leisure l = exp(x0b + a) can vary with observed characteristics in
a vector x, including variables relating to education, gender, age, and
marital status. Age is included by means of a quadratic function using
the age of the respondents in 2006 minus 22 (the age of the youngest
respondent in 2006). Note that age is age at the time of the survey
– age in this model is a time-invariant regressor aimed at capturing
cohort effects rather than age effects. Marital status is included by
means of a dummy variable with value 1 if the respondent belongs
to a couple and 0 otherwise, and an additional term interacting this
marital status dummy with the dummy male. Table 6.2 presents basic
descriptive statistics for these independent variables.
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables at the ﬁrst time
period a respondent is observed (N=498)
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Age 42.24 42.00 9.45
Man 0.50 0.00 0.50
% 0.00 1.00
Educ. Med. 0.33 0.00 0.47
Educ. High. 0.53 1.00 0.50
Partner 0.51 1.00 0.50
Net yearly wage 19,432.18 18,996.00 5,821.72
Net assets/debts 36,710.16 14,167.54 72,714.52
We see that the resulting sample has about as many men as it has
women, and as many singles as non-singles. As we can see from
the education dummies, the sample is highly educated, with most
respondents having what is considered as a high level of education.
This seemingly high level of education may partially be explained by
the fact that we focus on employed respondents, but nevertheless hints
that selection may be a problem.
The model includes two types of unobserved terms: the unobserved
heterogeneity a in preference for leisure and the retirement speciﬁc
error term #r. The error terms #r capture mood effects and reporting
error, and represent variations in preferences at the moment the re-
spondent is asked to evaluate the scenarios. For the sake of simplicity
and tractability, I assume that the error terms #r are i.i.d. distributed
with an extreme value type 1 distribution, leading to an econometric108 Using stated-preference data...
model of the logit family. This error term does not have a persistent
effect for the expected value function at time a + 1 and has an ex-
pected value of 0 in the future. Persistence in preferences is captured
only by the means of heterogeneity in preference for leisure. I include
respondent speciﬁc random-effects by means of the term a. I exploit
the panel dimension of the data, and assume that this term a is con-
stant over the waves that a respondent answered the survey. I assume
that this term is normally distributed with standard error sa, to be
estimated. It follows that a systematic preference for early retirement
over the waves of the survey is captured by means of a high value of
a, while reporting once a high preference for this scenario would be
captured by a high draw of the error term at this period. Finally, in
the estimation procedure, I constrain the parameter r to be between 0
and 1, as I enforce the constraint that respondents have a preference
for present consumption.
Note that the presence of random-effects a and of the error terms #r
does not affect the way I solve the optimization problem faced by the
agents, presented above. Given that I use a separable utility function,
the optimal consumption for a given retirement scenario is not affected
by the value of l, implying that the heterogeneity term a or any of
the covariates included in x (with the exception of gender) will not
affect optimal asset allocation. Similarly, given that #r is interpreted
as a non-persistent reporting error term, the value of this parameter
does not affect the optimal solution to the maximization problem.
6.3.3 Likelihood
As already mentioned, the estimation of the model relies on the rank-
ing of the scenarios. This approach contrasts with the usual estimation
of life-cycle models of this type that tend to rely either on variation in
consumption over time or on moment conditions based on observed
retirement. Given the assumptions made above, the model can con-
ceptually be characterized as a rank-logit model (see Beggs, Cardell,
and Hausman, 1981) with random-effects in the leisure parameter. In
order to allow for these random-effects, the model is estimated by
maximum simulated likelihood. In what follows, I will consider the
term of unobserved heterogeneity as given to keep the presentation
simpler. Moreover, for the sake of exposition, I deﬁne:






Suppose we have self-reported values, on a 10-point scale, of three
retirement paths denoted 1, 2, and 3. In the best case, it is possible to
determine the full ranking of the three scenarios. Say that a respondent6.4 estimation results 109
scores retirement path 1 better than path 2 and path 2 better than path
3. In such a case, the likelihood contribution of is given by











It may happen, however, that a respondent gives the same value to
two or three scenarios, and hence does not reveal the full ranking.
In such cases, an additional assumption is needed in order to use
the rank-logit model, namely that the ties are exogenous, and do not
depend on respondent characteristics, such as ranking capabilities
(see Fok, Paap, and van Dijk, 2010, for an example with unobserved
heterogeneity in capabilities). The approach I follow in cases of partial
ranking is to either maximize the probability that a scenario would be
preferred to the other two or the probability that a scenario would be
ranked last according to the information available.
Suppose that the respondent prefers 1 to 2 and to 3, but did not
express a preference between 2 and 3, then, the contribution is given
by:






which is simply be the likelihood of a multinomial logit. Then, in
a case where 1 and 2 are preferred to 3, but where there cannot be
discrimination between 1 and 2, the contribution is given by:



















This expression corresponds to the sum of the two combinations
associated with the scenarios in which 3 is ranked last.
Obviously, a respondent who gives the same value to all scenarios
would contribute a constant term to the likelihood and is omitted for
the maximization.
6.4 estimation results
Estimation results are presented in Table 6.3. Results are presented for
two groups: singles only in the left half of the table, and singles and
"half-couples" (as described in Section 6.2.2) in the right half. Then,
for each of these two groups, the model was estimated using a 1%, 2%
and 3% interest rate.110 Using stated-preference data...
Table 6.3: Estimation results
Singles only Singles and "half-couples"
1% interest 2% interest 3% interest 1% interest 2% interest 3% interest
r 0.965*** 0.956*** 0.949*** 0.968*** 0.964*** 0.960***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
g0 -0.197*** -0.160*** -0.179*** -0.160*** -0.140*** -0.145***
(0.050) (0.056) (0.060) (0.043) (0.046) (0.049)
gmale 0.023 0.015 0.009 0.018 0.013 0.010
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015)
bconstant -1.350*** -1.175** -1.570*** -1.046** -0.980** -1.217**
(0.145) (0.552) (0.589) (0.430) (0.455) (0.485)
bmale 0.145 0.076 0.020 0.074 0.032 0.001
0.280 (0.281) (0.281) (0.170) (0.171) (0.173)
beduc. med. -0.030 -0.034 -0.044 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014
0.067 (0.069) (0.073) (0.047) (0.049) (0.051)
beduc. high. -0.148** -0.152** -0.174** -0.110** -0.110** -0.118**
(0.063) (0.066) (0.070) (0.044) (0.046) (0.049)
bpartner 0.092* 0.091* 0.096*
(0.051) (0.053) (0.056)
bpartnermale -0.020 -0.022 -0.025
(0.067) (0.070) (0.074)
bage/10 0.110 0.192 0.293 0.157* 0.210** 0.306***
(0.152) (0.163) (0.184) (0.093) (0.099) (0.113)
bage-sqr/1000 -0.366 -0.516 -0.671 -0.451** -0.540** -0.703***
(0.360) (0.377) (0.414) (0.219) (0.233) (0.258)
sl 0.211 0.209 0.214 0.232 0.237 0.249
s# 0.095 0.107 0.075 0.129 0.139 0.121
Log-lik. -573.406 -575.552 -576.854 1148.562 1152.500 1156.237
N. Ind. 242 498
N 411 828
Standard errors between parentheses
Variable age is age in 2006 minus 22
The estimate of the parameter r is constrained to be between 0 and 16.5 simulations 111
The ﬁrst interesting result is that the discount rate obtained under
the various speciﬁcations was estimated precisely. The estimated val-
ues of the discount parameter did not change much, staying between
0.95 and 0.97 in all speciﬁcations. These values seem plausible and
are well in line with calibrated values in the studies referred to above.
Moreover, in all cases, the estimated values of the parameter g are also
plausible and are in line with ﬁndings in the literature For instance,
most of the estimates obtained for the larger sample have values
around -0.15, leading to a coefﬁcient of risk aversion of 1.15, which
would be in the lower spectrum of estimation from other studies (see
Blau and Gilleskie, 2006, for some examples). As a comparison, Hurd
(1989) estimated a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion equal to 1.12,
very close to the values obtained with the larger sample, and Rust and
Phelan (1997) obtained a value of 1.072.
The estimations did not reveal much about the determinants of pref-
erence for leisure. The results including only singles, presented in the
ﬁrst three columns, are generally quite imprecise. The only personal
characteristics with a signiﬁcant effect is the dummy capturing the
effect of higher education. Adding respondents with a partner leads to
slightly different conclusions. First, note that the dummy for whether
a respondent is in a couple or not is signiﬁcant at 10%-signiﬁcance
level (with all p-values smaller than 6%). I now ﬁnd a signiﬁcant age
trend. If we consider, for instance, the speciﬁcation with 2% interest
rate, the quadratic trend reaches its maximum value at 39 years old,
and decreases afterward. For most of the respondents, this effect is of
economically small importance. The effect becomes more important
for older respondents, which may be partially explained by a selection
issue. Remember that the analysis includes only working respondents.
Given that early retirement being important in the Netherlands, we
would expect that the older respondents are those with lower value
for leisure, everything else being held constant.
6.5 simulations
Due to the structural nature of the model, I can use the results to
predict the behavior of respondents under various scenarios. In this
section, I therefore explore the impact of various hypotheses on actual
behavior, paying particular attention to the possible reaction to a delay
of 2 years of eligibility to social security.
For the sake of comparison with previous studies, I present here an
analysis with a 2% real-interest rate. Parameters estimated with this
interest rate and with the large sample including couples were used
for the simulation. Given the current economic situation at the time
of writing these lines, the real interest rate is probably larger than it
should be.112 Using stated-preference data...
6.5.1 Initial results
Consider the original scenarios proposed to the respondents. For each
scenario, I can predict the probability that a respondent would prefer
this scenario over the others. To do so, random draws of the term of
unobserved heterogeneity a are taken, and the mean probabilities to
select each scenario conditional on these draws are computed.
Consider Simulation (1) in Table 6.4, presenting the average prob-
ability to retire at a given age given the heterogenous replacement
rates presented to the respondents. We see that the model predicts
large heterogeneity in retirement behavior. While the median and
modal retirement age would be 65, the proportion of respondents that
would choose to retire at 62 or 68 is substantial. Based on the dis-
cussion presented in Section 6.2.2, it is not surprising that the model
predicts about the same proportion of respondents with preference
for retirement at 65 and at 68. However, the share of preference for
early retirement seems quite high, although not entirely off the mark.
The results presented here are in line, at least qualitatively, with the
description of the Dutch pension system made by Capretta (2007).
However, these results are at odds with Voˇ nková and van Soest (2009),
who ﬁnd a strong preference for standard retirement at 65. The dif-
ference in results between this paper and theirs could be due to a
different subsample, focus on different stated-preference questions or
to the method itself.8
In these scenarios, each respondent faced different replacement
rates, meaning that respondents’ preferences were not directly compa-
rable. In what follows, I will consider alternative simulations where
respondents are offered comparable replacement rates.
6.5.2 Reference scenario and actuarial neutrality
For the remainder of the section, I want to offer comparable replace-
ment rates to all respondents conditional on their retirement at a given
age. I start from a common scenario where respondents are offered a
70% replacement should they retire at 65. This scenario will serve as a
benchmark. I use this information to compute replacement rates under
alternative scenarios. One important concept in the determination of
8 A quick analysis of the data hints that the variation in the subsample is indeed
an important factor. For instance, an analysis of the distribution of answers on the
10-point scale reveals that the respondents included in my sample do not exhibit
the strong preference for standard retirement over early retirement that is shown in
the histograms of Figure 1(c) in Voˇ nková and van Soest (2009). However, this does
not seem to be enough to justify the difference, and further investigation using their
estimation and simulations method would be needed to disentangle possible sources
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Remember that both income at 64 and survival probabilities will
vary by respondents, however this is omitted from the notation for
ease of presentation.
I assume that pensions are deﬁned in terms of the last wage, as was
the case in the hypothetical scenarios. Following a description in the
OECD guide for pensions, the replacement rate at 65 is deﬁned as
1.75% times the number of years worked, assuming a full career of 40
years. For each respondent, I compute the pension wealth at age 65
for a given retirement age given by:
PW65(r) = 1.75%(r   25) AF(65)w64 (6.10)
which obviously implies that the value of the pension wealth at 65 for
someone retiring at 65 is given by:
PW65(65) = 70% AF(65)w64. (6.11)
The scheme used here has a strange contribution pattern, in the
sense that the contribution’s value at age 65 is the same indepen-
dently of the age at which it was made, and that hence, the real value
contributed at each time period is increasing over time.
I ﬁrst want to compute various scenarios under actuarial neutrality,
taking into account both the increase in pension wealth due to the
contributions over time by and mortality risk. In the current setting,





Note that s65,r is equal to one if r < 65 in this model where there is
no mortality between 62 and 68.
Column (2) in Table 6.4 presents a simulation of retirement scenar-
ios with the same retirement ages that were used before, but with
actuarially neutral replacement rates. To simplify the presentation,
the replacement rates presented in the table are the average of the re-
placement rates offered to each respondent for a given retirement age.
On average, these rates are close to the most generous hypothetical
scenarios presented to the respondents. These rates would lead to a
substantial fraction of the workers retiring at age 62, as almost half of
them would be predicted to retire at that age under this progression.6.5 simulations 115
Another way to look at this is that the rates that were used in the
scenarios were encouraging work considerably. This could actually
be the case. Using a 70% replacement rate at age 65 and actuarially
neutral rates for ages 62 and 68 is comparable to one of the most
generous sets of replacement rates used in the scenarios, as seen in
the 6th column of Table 6.1. In the simulations, agents react to this by
retiring earlier. Compared to the values observed in Table 6.1, how-
ever, it seems that the model predicts a higher share of respondents
preferring early retirement than we observe in the data.
To allow for more ﬂexibility in retirement, Simulation (3) allows
a respondent to retire at every age between 61 and 70. The average
retirement age in this model is predicted to be 64.6 years.
While the fact that each respondent receives a different set of replace-
ment rates enforces the concept of actuarial neutrality, this approach
to pension plans is not realistic. An alternative approach would be
to use the same replacement rates for all individuals. In order to do
so, I realized two simulations. First, I supposed that each respondents
would receive the average replacement rate, as seen in Simulation (3)
of Table 6.4. Results are very similar to the one already presented,
leading to a decrease in the retirement age of 0.03 years (12 days),
and are not reported in the Table. I was also interested in using the
OECD replacement rates used by Voˇ nková and van Soest (2009), in
order to compare my results to theirs. This was done in Simulation
(4), allowing us to assess the impact of variations in replacement rates.
We see that using this rate leads to an average retirement age of 64.4,
a diminution of 0.2 years, about two months, compared to Simulation
(3). This would indicate that the agents in the model are very sensitive
to seemingly small variations in replacement rates.
6.5.3 Delayed eligibility to public pension
The Dutch government, as most governments in developed countries,
is in the process of reforming social security in order to curb future
costs. Among the policies evaluated, a progressive increase of the
eligibility age to AOW from age 65 to 67 is the most likely element of
reform. I mentioned above that public and private pensions are often
integrated in the Netherlands, with the aim of offering a given gross
replacement rate to a worker retiring at 65. Hence, a shock to social
security like this proposed pension reform is not straightforward to
implement in my simulations, as I must make additional assumptions
concerning how the occupational pensions schemes would adjust.
The approach I consider is to interpret the pension reform as a shock
to the value of the pension wealth at 65 that would be absorbed by
the occupational pension. I simply remove two years of social security
from the pension wealth computed in Equation 6.11 and compute new
replacement rates based on Equation 6.12. Given that the scenarios are116 Using stated-preference data...
expressed in terms of net income, I approximate the value of social
security to be the value received by singles in 2008, and assume that
everyone pays on this amount the lowest rate of income tax. This leads
to a gross yearly value of 12,718 euros on which a 33.60% tax is paid.
Considering the delay of two years proposed, the net total reduction
of PW65(65) is therefore 16,724 euros.
This last simulation, numbered (5), is presented in Table 6.4. We see,
for instance, that the average age of retirement increases by 0.3 years,
an increase of four months. The impact of this delayed eligibility to
social security may look quite small at ﬁrst glance. It has to be stressed
that the Netherlands is a country where individuals accumulate a large
pension wealth during their lifetime. According to the most recent
OECD report on pensions available at the time of writing (cf OECD,
2011), the median Dutch man accumulates 12.8 times his net income
in pension wealth while the median Dutch woman accumulates 14.6
times her net income. These numbers are among the highest in the
countries reviewed in the publication. Thus, a reduction by two years
of public pension on the total pension wealth does not have an effect
as strong as one might expect.
An important aspect that must not be overlooked is that the reform
is expected to have different effects on different individuals. For re-
spondents with lower income, for instance, social security represents
a larger share of the pension wealth than for richer individuals. Other
factors may affect behavior. Younger respondents have more time to
adjust their behavior to a policy change such as delayed eligibility
to social security than older respondents. Even leaving aside differ-
ences in preferences, we therefore predict more important changes in
behavior for older respondents who do not have time to adjust their
consumption over a long period of time. To see how this is translated
in terms of the current model, consider Figure 6.1, presenting scat-
terplots of the predicted delay in retirement of our respondents by
income (left panel) and age (right panel).9 We see that at any given
level of income and at any given age, the model predicts a substantial
variation in behavior. In both cases, the average trends are correctly
predicted.
Another way by which the respondents can adapt to the change
in policy is by reducing their consumption.10 The structural model
used in this paper allows predictions on consumption and savings. It
is therefore possible to predict changes in consumption that would be
induced by the policy described above. Let us consider the immediate
effect of the reform on consumption. To do so, let us consider the
largest variation that the reform could induce in the model at the
9 One respondent with very low income was excluded from the graph. This respondent
was predicted to delay retirement by almost two years.
10 Given the discrete nature of the model a consumption increase is possible. Given that
a respondent can only retire once a year, he may decide to delay retirement and to
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Figure 6.1: Predicted delay in planned retirement current income (left panel)
and age (right panel), assuming that retirement is ﬁxed at 65. The
line is a non-parametric estimate of conditional expectations.
current time period and for a respondent planning to retire at 65.
We compare the predicted consumption before and after the reform.
This simulation is equivalent to the case of a respondent who did not
forecast the change in policy and who learns of this change at the
current time period. Given that most respondents seem to anticipate
the reform to some extent (see Bissonnette and van Soest, 2011), and
given that many of them may delay retirement, the difference in
consumption path is likely to overestimate the observed effect and
should be interpreted as an upper bound on predicted consumption
change. Consider Figure 6.2, presenting scatterplots of the predicted
variation by income (left panel) and by age (right panel). We hardly see
a systematic effect of income on the immediate consumption decline,
should retirement be ﬁxed at 65. We also see that age is an important
factor in the prediction. As we forecasted, older respondents would
have to adapt their consumption more than younger respondents.
However, remember that the current reform of AOW that should
be implemented is gradual, and that a full delay in eligibility will
only be in effect for respondents aged 55 or less. In this simulation, I
supposed that everybody receives the same negative shock on their
pension wealth, such that respondents aged over 55 have the same
penalty as younger respondents. Therefore, the reaction to the policy
reform should be smaller for older respondents than is simulated there.
Note also that a lot of younger respondents would not change their
consumption at all. This is due to the fact that they were prevented
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Figure 6.2: Predicted variation of consumption for current year by current
income (left panel) and age (right panel), assuming that retirement
is ﬁxed at 65.
retirement with a value of accumulated assets equal to 0, as they did
before.
To summarize these simulations, it seems that the model predicts
that poorer respondents would tend to delay retirement more than
higher earners should this reform pass, and to predict that a decrease
of consumption is mostly caused by age. There is nevertheless a lot of
heterogeneity in the predicted reaction to this reform.
6.6 discussion and conclusion
In this paper, I used simple questions where respondents are asked to
state their preferences concerning hypothetical scenarios to estimate a
life-cycle model of retirement and savings. I ﬁnd that the estimated
model yields a plausible estimation of parameters, generally in line
with results from the literature, and showed that many of the problems
I faced came from the small sample size or from unavailable data that
could easily be elicited. Respondents seem to answer the questions in
a way that is consistent over time, as seen from the importance of the
random effects in the analysis. The scenarios I analyze are both easy
to understand and are in line with the deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans
predominant in the Netherlands, which means that they may relate to
them even if they do not have access to such retirement plans. Thus I
could not ﬁnd any obvious reason not to use stated preferences in the
analysis of retirement and savings.6.6 discussion and conclusion 119
The next logical step for this research is to try to compare the
predictions of this estimated model with actual behavior. As time
goes by, we will be able to verify whether respondents who stated a
higher preference for early retirement are also those retiring earlier, or
will be able to use actual saving patterns to evaluate the adequacy of
the model used. Failing to reconcile stated and revealed preferences
would probably cast doubt on the usefulness of the stated-preference
approach. Still, if what people report is what they plan or hope to
achieve, or if it reﬂects their preferences at a given point in time,
there may be some usefulness for the current analysis. A simple
and straightforward application is to evaluate how a population may
vote on some propositions. Understanding this is important if policy
makers want to have the support of the population when proposing
pension reforms, notably in states where votes and referendums are
omnipresent. The state of California, for instance, is a good example.
For the sake of the discussion, let us assume that the information
contained in the stated preference data is shown to be relevant for
the study of retirement and savings. In this case, I will undoubtedly
want to improve the simple model I presented here. Many of the short-
comings of this research are not due to the absence of an appropriate
theory or to the high cost of eliciting the relevant data, but rather to
the modest sample size available at the time of writing or to the lack
of a required piece of information in the dataset. These problems are
not a serious barrier to future research. Eliciting data of this type is
not particularly expensive or challenging, mostly with access to pan-
els such as the CentERpanel. There are a number of interesting and
important factors that we may want to control for. The structural form
dictates well how to augment the model, and, once the new value
function is computed, the econometric model requires only minor
adjustments, if any.
Future research topics may include better measurement of risk aver-
sion or may rely on dynamically inconsistent preferences (e.g. Laibson,
1997). These last two examples would require cleverly designed future
scenarios, both easy to understand for the respondents and complete
enough to identify the model used. The fact that researchers can easily
vary the assessed scenarios in an experimental manner should be a
useful tool to actually identify these effects. Household structure and
joint retirement are other interesting topics. I did not take into account,
for instance, the number of children or dependent family members in
each household. Again, the decision to exclude these characteristics
from the model was mostly driven by the relatively small size of the
sample available. We can nevertheless think of an extension to this
model that would take these elements into account. In this case, we
would probably want to allow the utility from consumption to vary
according to the number of family members, but could presume that
the value of leisure after retirement should not be affected (assuming120 Using stated-preference data...
that the children are no longer living with their parents, naturally).
Finally, some health related variables, like self-assessed health, should
probably be included in the leisure parameter. It would also be inter-
esting to measure perceived spouse’s health, and see how it affects
retirement plans. Subjective survival probabilities could also be used
in order to control for heterogeneity in frailty among the respondents.
While these last variables were not available in the dataset, eliciting
them does not pose a great challenge. Some of this information will
be available in the 2011 yearly wave of the Pension Barometer Survey,
allowing me (and hopefully other researchers) to improve the realism
of the model.
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6.a assets and debts definitions
I list here the list of assets and debt used in the aggregated deﬁni-
tion. This list is the same as presented in some work I co-authored
(Bissonnette and van Soest, 2010). The value of accumulated asset
used in computation is the difference between wealth and debt at the
beginning of the year. The elements included are as follows:
Wealth is the sum of the total amounts of the following elements:
1. Checking account




6. Single-premium insurance policies




11. All kinds of options
12. Real estate not used for housing
13. Money lent to family
14. Investment not mentioned before
15. Stocks for substantial holding
16. Business equity
The debt is the sum of the total amounts of these elements:
1. Private loans
2. Extended lines of credit
3. Debt with mail-order ﬁrms
4. Hire-purchase contracts
5. Loans from family and friends
6. Study loans
7. Credit card debts
8. Loans not mentioned before6.B on the dutch pension system 125
6.b on the dutch pension system
The description of the Dutch pension system contained in this part
is based on more detailed articles written by de Vos and Kapteyn
(2004) and Bovenberg and Gradus (2008). Other useful sources of
information are the yearly publication by the OECD titled Pension at
Glance (e.g. OECD, 2011) and the report written by Capretta (2007).
I refer readers interested in additional details to these publications.
Before going further, I want to stress that the data used in this paper
were elicited between 2006 and 2008. Hence, some more recent changes
discussed by Bovenberg and Gradus may not have been in place when
the respondents answered the survey.
Let us think about the Dutch pension system in terms of three
pillars. The ﬁrst pillar, the AOW, is a minimum pension provided by
the government, and is a form of social security. This public pension is
linked to the minimum wage. For instance, singles receive 70% of the
minimum wage after the age of 65 and an individual in a two-person
household receives 50% of this amount. Then, as a second pillar, a
large fraction of the labor force (about 90% according to Bovenberg and
Gradus) are entitled to an occupational pension. This large proportion
is explained by the fact that participation to the pension scheme is
mandatory if an employer offers it. According to de Vos and Kapteyn:
"until recently, more than 99 percent of the pension schemes were of
the deﬁned-beneﬁt type, most of them being deﬁned on the basis of
ﬁnal pay". Bovenberg and Gradus report that career-average schemes,
however, are becoming more common. According the OECD, the ﬁrst
and second pillar are often integrated, so that workers are offered a
70% replacement rate if they retire at age 65 and had a stable career.
Finally, third pillar pension, individual provisions, is relatively small
in the Netherlands.
Another important element in the Dutch system is the large preva-
lence of early retirement, due to a very generous pay-as-you-go option
(called VUT) that were ﬁrst set in place with the intention to curb
unemployment by increasing the number of retiree. Given the high
costs associated with this program, it was decided in 2005 that VUT
would be abolished. Nevertheless, according to Capretta (2007): "With
over two-thirds of men (and over four-ﬁfths of women) exiting the
workforce by age 60, early retirement is still the norm." It should also
be noted that reaching age 65 is a legitimate reason for dismissal and
that it is not possible to delay payment of AOW beyond this age. In
effect, 65 is the mandatory retirement age for most occupations. Hence,
whereas Dutch in the labor force may plan to retire early, they may not
perceive that staying in the labor force past 65 is an option for them, or
at least can consider it as riskier than usually acknowledged. A brief
analysis on this point is presented by van Soest et al. (2006). Respon-
dents in their sample were asked the earliest and latest age at which126 Appendix
they could retire according to their employer’s pension plans. They
report that the earliest age varies from 55 to 65 (median of 62, mean
of 61.7) and that latest retirement was concentrated at age 65. Another
important aspect is that the most frequently used answer for early
retirement is also 65, implying that a large fraction of respondents do
not think that they have any ﬂexibility regarding their retirement age.